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Foreword
Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen
This working paper is part of a series of eight case study reports on governance transfer by 
regional organizations around the world. It was prepared in the framework of the SFB 700 project 
B2, “Exporting (Good) Governance: Regional Organizations and Areas of Limited Statehood”. 
Together with regional experts, we have investigated how and under which conditions regional 
organizations prescribe and promote standards for (legitimate) governance (institutions) at the 
national level. A comparison of major regional organizations shall enable us to evaluate to what 
extent we can observe the diffusion of a global governance script. Do regional organizations 
demand and promote similar criteria for “good governance” institutions, or do regional and 
local particularities prevail? The B2 case study reports present detailed findings for eight 
regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East. They cover the African 
Union (Julia Leininger), the Economic Community of West African States (Christof Hartmann), 
the Southern African Development Community (Anna van der Vleuten and Merran Hulse), the 
Organization of American States (Mathis Lohaus), Mercosur (Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (Francesco Duina), the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (Anja Jetschke), and the League of Arab States (Vera van Hüllen).
The B2 case study reports rely on a common set of analytical categories for mapping the relevant 
actors, standards, and mechanisms in two dimensions of governance transfer.1 First, we examine 
the prescription of standards and the policies for their promotion (objectives, instruments) that 
create the institutional framework for governance transfer. Second, we investigate the adoption 
and application of actual measures. Regarding the actors involved in governance transfer, we 
are interested in the role of regional actors on the one hand, as standard-setters and promoters, 
and domestic actors on the other, as addressees and targets of governance transfer. Even though 
the question of which criteria regional organizations establish for legitimate governance 
institutions is an empirical one, we relate the content and objectives of governance transfer 
to the broader concepts of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. 
Finally, we classify different instruments of governance transfer according to their underlying 
mechanism of influence, distinguishing between (1) litigation and military force (coercion), (2) 
sanctions and rewards (incentives), (3) financial and technical assistance (capacity-building), and 
(4) fora for dialogue and exchange (persuasion and socialization).
The B2 case study reports result from more than two years of continuous cooperation on 
the topic, including three workshops in Berlin and joint panels at international conferences. 
The reports follow the same template: They provide background information on the regional 
organization, present the findings of a systematic mapping of governance transfer, and suggest 
an explanation for its specific content, form, and timing. They form the basis for a systematic 
1 For detailed information on our analytical framework, please refer to our research guide for case study 
authors (Börzel et al. 2011).
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comparison of governance transfer by these eight regional organizations (for first results, see 
Börzel, van Hüllen, Lohaus 2013), as well as further joint publications.
We would like to thank the people who have made this cooperation a pleasant and fruitful 
endeavor and one that we hope to continue: In particular, we would like to thank our regional 
experts, Francesco Duina, Christof Hartmann, Anja Jetschke, Julia Leininger, Mathis Lohaus, 
Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Anna van der Vleuten and Merran Hulse for their willingness to 
share our interest in governance transfer and for their conceptual and empirical input into 
the project. We are also grateful to Heba Ahmed, Carina Breschke, Mathis Lohaus, Lea Spörcke, 
Sören Stapel, and Kai Striebinger for their valuable research assistance and other support to 
our joint B2 project. Special thanks go to Anne Hehn, Anna Jüschke, Clara Jütte, and the entire 
“Team Z” of the SFB 700, who have unfailingly smoothed the way in all matters concerning 
administration and publication. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the financial support from 
the German Research Foundation (DFG), which made the project possible.
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Governance Transfer by the Southern African Development Community
A B2 Case Study Report
Anna van der Vleuten and Merran Hulse
Abstract:
As early as 1992, the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) already 
included a commitment to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as governance 
standards in its member states, but it was in 2001 that SADC significantly broadened its 
efforts at governance transfer. SADC focuses in particular on standards related to gender, 
(socioeconomic) human rights, and (electoral) democracy, which are promoted and protected 
through various instruments including military interventions and sanctions in the framework 
of security cooperation. While the rule of law and good governance have also gained a more 
prominent place on the agenda since 2001, standards and instruments are less developed. 
Overall, there is a significant gap between the prescription of standards and policies on the 
one hand and the implementation of measures on the other. The suspension of the SADC 
Tribunal in 2010 following its rulings on human rights issues clearly shows the limits of SADC 
as an active promoter vis-à-vis its member states.
Zusammenfassung:
Schon der Vertrag der Südafrikanischen Entwicklungsgemeinschaft (SADC) von 1992 enthielt 
ein Bekenntnis zu Menschenrechten, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit als Standards für 
(gutes) Regieren in den Mitgliedstaaten. SADC entwickelte seinen Governance-Transfer jedoch 
erst 2001 entscheidend weiter. SADC fokussiert dabei auf Standards mit Bezug zu Gender-
Fragen, (sozio-ökonomischen) Menschenrechten und (Wahl-)Demokratie. Die Instrumente 
zum Schutz und zur Förderung dieser Standards umfassen auch militärische Interventionen 
und Sanktionen im Rahmen von Zusammenarbeit im Sicherheitsbereich. Obwohl SADC 
2001 auch Standards mit Bezug zu Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Good Governance gesetzt hat, 
sind die Instrumente in diesen Bereichen weniger gut entwickelt. Insgesamt gibt es eine 
deutliche Lücke zwischen der Festschreibung von Standards und Politiken einerseits und der 
Durchführung von Maßnahmen andererseits. Die Suspendierung des SADC Tribunals in der 
Folge eines Urteils zu Menschenrechtsfragen zeigt die Grenzen SADCs als aktiver Förderer 
von Governance-Standards gegenüber den Mitgliedstaaten.
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1. Introduction1
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has two primary objectives: economic 
cooperation in pursuit of the eradication of poverty, and political cooperation to achieve the 
peace and stability that is conducive to economic development. Its origins can be traced back 
to the Frontline States (FLS) and the Liberation struggles of the (post)colonial era. They are still 
visible in the founding treaty of 1992, which contains the norms of nondiscrimination and 
respect for human rights. However, norm promotion is often hindered by the very same legacy. 
Because of the experiences of colonialism, civil war, and apartheid, SADC actors highly value the 
principle of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of nation-states and are loath to violate it. 
Since an institutional overhaul in 2001, SADC has become a more coherent organization than 
it was before, yet it still suffers from a lack of human capital and financial resources, which 
exacerbates problems of implementation.
An analysis of SADC main policy texts shows that the organization is engaged in the promotion 
of democracy, human rights, good governance, and rule of law to varying extents. The standards 
reflect continental (AU) and/or global (UN, ILO) norms. SADC tends to frame them in a rather 
narrow way, although the strength of the SADC gender regime in terms of standard setting 
and promotion is striking. Democratic standards have been a part of SADC policy since 1992, 
but democracy tends to be equated here with the occurrence of well-organized elections. Since 
2004, observer missions have been sent to almost all elections. In most cases, assessments by 
the SADC reports seem to be confirmed by the reports of other organizations, except for two 
cases: Swaziland and Zimbabwe, SADC’s two least democratic countries. SADC has undertaken 
some diplomatic and military interventions to “safeguard democracy,” but only when political 
violence threatened the stability and legitimacy of an incumbent government. The democratic 
character of SADC itself is rather weak, as it has no regional parliament and no parliamentary 
oversight over its activities. Human rights standards appear in almost all key policy documents. 
They tend to focus on socioeconomic rights more than civil-political rights. The principle of 
nondiscrimination is prominently present, arguably due to the region’s experiences of officially 
sanctioned racism during colonialism and apartheid. Principles of rule of law have emerged 
since 2001. However, this appears to be mere lip service: the contradictions and tensions 
resulting from the coexistence of official legal systems (inherited from the colonial era) 
alongside customary practices are not properly addressed, and the regional court was dissolved 
after finding Zimbabwean government policy contrary to the rule of law. Finally, the concept of 
good governance also appears from 2001 onward, mainly framed in terms of good economic/
corporate governance and fighting corruption, as part of the aim to increase economic growth 
and become more attractive to foreign direct investment.
1 We gratefully acknowledge research assistance by Annique Claessen, Jody van der Helm, Deborah 
Lassche and Peter de Jong.
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SADC has adopted these standards pushed by: 
(1) Its desire to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and donor money in order to 
combat poverty, by signaling its commitment to international standards (e.g., election 
observer missions; anti-corruption);
(2) Its need for political stability, which has motivated its interventions (curbing negative 
externalities);
(3) Post-apartheid South Africa, which aspires to be a regional and continental hegemon 
and a global player, pushing for international recognition of a proud, strong, and 
modern (Southern) Africa that complies with international standards (international 
legitimacy); 
(4) Domestic and transnational non-state actors (opposition parties, social movements, 
trade unions) who push for domestic reforms through the regional level.  
Because of its dependence on external funding and its desire to attract FDI, SADC is sensitive 
to external pressure to adopt standards, but because of the organization’s roots and mission, 
member state governments will only adopt measures that satisfy donors without undermining 
their autonomy. As a result, many principles and measures contained in SADC policy remain 
chimeras. Even worse, when vaguely formulated principles or freshly created institutions start 
to unfold, they are ignored or redressed, as was the case with the Tribunal (suspended since 
2010). 
The mapping and collection of data concerning governance transfer by SADC was no easy task. 
We were politely but clearly refused access to Organ documents. The SADC library in Gaborone, 
Botswana, retains only a limited and somewhat arbitrary selection of SADC material. Some 
documents have been referenced in the media or in other documents, so we know they exist, 
but we have not been able to track them down. It seems that the institutional reshuffling that 
began in 2001 may have complicated the archiving and storage of documentation. We were told 
that the earlier SEOM reports may have been “lost” in this process, but this does not explain why 
we found no trace of more recent reports. We have gratefully drawn on analyses from scholars 
in Southern African think tanks and publications such as the Monitoring Regional Integration 
in Southern Africa Yearbook, and were very appreciative to conduct interviews with key players.
2. The Southern African Development Community (SADC): An Overview 
2.1 History of SADC
SADC has long suffered from institutional incoherence, a legacy of its turbulent past. The 
institutional roots of SADC can be found in the Frontline States (FLS), an organization founded 
in 1970 by the region’s independent states. The FLS aimed to reduce member states’ economic 
reliance on South Africa and promote the liberation of countries under foreign or minority rule. 
The FLS developed two substructures: one for economic cooperation, which would eventually 
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become the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and one for 
cooperation on security, which would eventually develop into the SADC Organ. 
The primary objective of SADCC was to increase economic cooperation among members 
in order to reduce economic dependence on a hostile South Africa and promote equitable 
development of the region’s economies. By the late 1980s, the leaders of the FLS decided that 
the organization should be formalized “to give it an appropriate legal status” (Actrav 2012). This 
decision was implemented in 1992, when SADCC was renamed and reorganized as the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). South Africa joined SADC in 1994, officially ending 
the longstanding hostilities between that country and its regional neighbors. In 2001, SADC 
embarked on a major project of institutional reform with the intention of providing stronger 
leadership and increasing the capacity to implement policies. An amended Treaty was signed in 
March 2001. 
Regarding cooperation in security matters, in 1975, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia 
established the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) as a substructure of the 
FLS, to coordinate their efforts to aid the liberation of neighboring countries struggling against 
colonial and minority rule (Malan 1998). As other countries in the region gained independence, 
they too joined the FLS and the ISDSC. The ISDSC had no charter or constitution, no 
headquarters or secretariat. It brought together the ministers responsible for defense, home 
affairs/police, and state security/intelligence. With the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, 
the FLS dissolved itself while the ISDSC was retained. Its objectives focused on cooperation in 
the fields of defense, public security, and state security (the latter including political instability, 
armed conflict, influx of refugees, religious extremism and other potential threats to the 
stability of the subregion). In 2001, the ISDSC and its subcommittees were incorporated into 
the SADC Organ. 
The SADC Organ came into being much later than the ISDSC. It was first discussed in 1994 at 
a workshop on democracy, peace, and security, which sought to set SADC on a course toward 
formal involvement in security cooperation, conflict mediation, and military cooperation. 
In January 1996, the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and security agreed to establish an 
SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, “which would allow more flexibility and timely 
response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations” (SARDC, 2001). 
However, an ongoing dispute between Zimbabwe, in favor of a parallel flexible and informal 
approach reminiscent of the FLS, and South Africa, in favor of a legal mechanism under the 
control of the SADC Summit, prevented the Organ from functioning properly (Francis 2006). 
The unsatisfactory manner in which the 1998 military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho 
were decided and conducted resulted in a Summit decision “that the Council of Ministers 
should review the operations of all SADC institutions, including the Organ … and report to the 
Summit within six months” (SADC 1999a). The Organ has been part of SADC since August 2001, 
and its functions are laid out in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. 
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2.2 Membership
When the Treaty of 1992 was signed, SADC had 10 member states. The five subsequent 
members joined between 1994 and 2005 (see Figure 1). Madagascar has been suspended from 
the Organization since 2009 after a political crisis resulted in an unconstitutional change of 
government. In 2003, the Seychelles briefly left SADC in a dispute over unpaid membership 
dues, but it rejoined in 2007 after obtaining a hugely decreased annual membership fee (from 
approximately US$2 million to US$75,000) (SADC Secretariat 2007). 
Figure 1: Member states of the SADC
Table 1: Membership in SADC and its forerunners2
State Membership
Angola Members of the 
Frontline States
Founding members 
of SADCC (1980)
Founding members of 
SADC (1992)Botswana
Lesotho
Mozambique
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Swaziland
Namibia Joined 1990
South Africa Accession 28 Aug 1994
Mauritius Accession 28 Aug 1995
DRC Accession 28 Feb 1998 
Seychelles
Joined 1997, left 2004, 
rejoined 2007
Madagascar
Accession 21 Feb 2006, 
suspended since 2009
2 Source: own compilation.
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Membership Criteria 
Initially, SADC did not have any formal membership requirements beyond the payment of 
membership dues. The 1992 Treaty only specifies in Article 8 that “the admission of any State 
to membership of SADC shall be effected by a unanimous decision of the Summit,” and that 
“membership of SADC shall not be subject to any reservations.” In August 1995, the Summit 
adopted more stringent criteria for membership including a democracy clause (see Table 2).
Table 2: Comparison between 1995 and 2003 membership criteria3 
1995 membership criteria 2003 membership criteria
Geographic proximity to SADC region Geographic proximity to SADC region
Commonality of political, economic, social, 
and cultural systems of the applicant with the 
systems of the SADC region.
Commonality of political, economic, social, 
and cultural systems of the applicant with the 
systems of the SADC region, as well as the 
observance of the principles of democracy, 
human rights, good governance, and the rule of 
law in accordance with the African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights.
Must be a democracy, observing the principles of 
human rights and the rule of law
Feasibility of cost-effective and efficient 
coordination of the applicants economic, 
social, and cultural activities under the SADC 
framework of cooperation
Should have a good track record and ability 
to honour its obligations and to participate 
effectively and efficiently in the SADC 
Programme of Action for the benefit of the 
Community 
Absence of a record of engagement in subversive 
and destabilization activities, and territorial 
ambitions against SADC or any of its member 
states
Should not be at war, and should not be involved 
or engaged in subversive and destabilization 
activities, and have territorial ambitions against 
SADC, any of its members states  or any member 
state of the African Union
Must share SADC’s ideals and aspirations Should have levels of macro-economic indicators 
in line with targets set in the RISDP
The membership conditions changed again in 2003. The reason for this appears to be an attempt 
by Rwanda to join SADC, submitting an application in 2001 (interview PR). Considering the 
hostile relations between Rwanda and the DRC, it was fairly unlikely that Rwanda’s application 
would be seriously entertained. In February 2002, the SADC Council claimed to instate a 
moratorium on the acceptance of new members (SADC Secretariat 2002). In August 2003, the 
Summit approved the new membership criteria. With respect to the Rwandan bid, the 2004 
Summit merely noted that the country had been informed of the new criteria, “which they 
3 Source: own compilation, based on Record of the Meeting of the SADC Council of Ministers, Dar-Es 
Salaam, Tanzania, August 23–24, 2003 (SADC Secretariat 2003a).
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have to meet” (SADC Secretariat 2004). The document did not articulate which criteria Rwanda 
might have been failing to meet, but the clause barring member states from being “engaged 
in subversive activities” was likely foremost among the Summit’s concerns. Evidently Rwanda 
was not deterred by the new criteria, as it submitted a new application in 2005. The SADC 
Summit noted that it “appreciates Rwanda’s intention to join SADC. However Rwanda should 
be encouraged and assisted by SADC Member States to normalize its relations with the DRC 
before her application can be considered” (SADC Secretariat 2005). In the end, the Rwandan 
application was rejected outright. Rwanda instead joined the East African Community in 2007.
(Non-)application of the Democracy Clause
SADC’s democracy clause for membership was introduced in 1995 after South Africa joined. All 
states to join since then have been democratic, with the notable exception of the DRC, which failed 
to meet at least three of the six membership criteria when it joined in 1998. The change in criteria 
in 2003 diluted the democracy requirement, from “must be a democracy” to “observance of the 
principles of democracy” (see Table 2). Perhaps this reflects an ad hoc, after-the-fact legitimization 
of the DRC’s acceptance into the SADC fold, but whatever the reason, it certainly represents a 
step backward for the promotion of democratic institutions in existing and potential member 
states. Added to this is the fact that the member states considered very undemocratic—namely 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola, and the DRC—do not experience sanctions by SADC (although 
in the cases of Zimbabwe and the DRC, there are ongoing, SADC-backed negotiations working 
toward improved political dialogue; for more details, see section 3.2). 
In 2004, SADC considered the application from Madagascar. The Madagascan application 
seemed to proceed apace, with the Summit noting that the country had “no history of 
generating conflicts and war with its neighbours and other SADC countries” (SADC Secretariat 
2004). Madagascar was granted official candidate status for one year in August 2004. SADC 
fielded a fact-finding mission to Madagascar, during which the Executive Secretary and troika 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs met with representatives of the Malagasy government, members 
of the opposition, NGOs, civil society and trade union leaders, and parliamentarians. The 
opposition leaders “indicated to the Delegation that the Government is a dictatorship and 
that there is no respect for Democracy in Madagascar” (SADC Secretariat 2004). In response, 
the delegation explained that the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections aimed precisely to foster democracy in member states. Madagascar became a full 
member of SADC in February 2006, but experienced a constitutional coup in 2009 and has 
since been suspended from SADC. 
2.3 Identity and Mission
SADC is bound together by the common goals and interests expressed in the Treaty (1992; 2001) 
as well as the two primary policy documents, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan (RISDP) (2003), and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) (2004). “The RISDP 
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and SIPO are the heartbeats of the Community” (Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, address 
to the Summit, August 17, 2006); they make clear that the prevailing mission of SADC is: 
“To promote sustainable and equitable growth and socio-economic development 
through efficient productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good 
governance, and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a 
competitive and efficient player in international relations and the world economy.”  
(SADC 2001-a: Article 5 and SADC 2003-b: 4)
SADC’s mission essentially consists of twin processes: trade integration (the economic 
dimension) and the creation of conditions for peace and stability (the political dimension), 
which are seen as preconditions for sustainable economic development. They are intended to 
be parallel, but there is more emphasis today on the peace and security aspect than on the trade 
and (economic) governance aspect (interview GM). 
SADC has a regional identity rooted in the Liberation struggles and the principles of solidarity, 
sovereignty, and postcolonial independence. SADC’s root organizations, the FLS and SADCC, 
were opposed to colonial and minority rule, and many states provided safe havens for exiled 
ANC leaders and training camps for guerrilla fighters. The apartheid government retaliated 
with a policy of regional destabilization toward its neighbors, especially Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Angola, and Mozambique. When apartheid finally came to an end, it was generally felt that South 
Africa owed a great debt to its neighbors for their help in enabling the ANC to achieve majority 
rule. Considering its previous role as a hostile destabilizer in the region, as well as the “debt” 
it owed to its neighboring states, democratic South Africa has been reluctant to be seen telling 
other states what to do or criticizing any figures from the Liberation struggle who are still active 
in the region’s politics (see Annex 2 for a list of Liberation leaders). The Liberation struggle is 
so central to the identity of the region that SADC member states have pledged almost US$1.5 
million to the Hashim Mbita Project, a long-running research project to record the history 
of the liberation movements in the eight “core” countries of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (SADC Secretariat 2007). The shared 
experiences of colonialism and long struggles for independence have created a strong sense of 
unity and solidarity. As former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa put it: 
“SADC is rooted in struggle; from which we have much to learn … the first lesson 
is unity. Without unity the armed struggle would have buckled in the face of the 
superior weaponry of our erstwhile enemies. And today, as we wage the struggle to 
carve for ourselves a place at the table of a global economy, we must remain united. 
There is no alternative to unity.”  (Address to the SADC Summit, October 3, 2002, 
SADC Secretariat 2002: Annex) 
However, the principle of unity and solidarity does not extend so far as to surrender aspects 
of hard-won and jealously guarded sovereignty to supranational regional organizations, and 
interference in the internal affairs of countries is unwelcome. 
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The issue of land reform, particularly in the countries that hosted significant settler populations, 
is central to the postcolonial regional identity and has a strong impact on domestic and 
regional politics. These governments view the concentration of fertile land in the hands of a 
few thousand wealthy (usually white) farmers as a historical injustice from the colonial era that 
must be rectified in order to right the wrongs of the past and set the region on a more equitable 
and sustainable path. This has met with criticism both domestically and internationally for 
creating agricultural inefficiencies and food shortages, to which Mkapa has said:
“Frankly, I find it insulting that there are powers and people who believe food 
shortages in the region can only be averted when Africans become servants on 
white people’s land …. [N]ot many black farmers in Africa will be as productive as 
their white counterparts … but that is no reason to perpetuate historic injustices.”  
(Address to the Summit, August 25, 2003, SADC Secretariat 2003a: Annex) 
Taken together, these aspects of regional identity make it difficult for SADC member states 
to criticize each other, since criticism opens them to accusations of acting like a “Western 
puppet” or violating the principle of sovereign equality. For the same reasons, international 
criticism is often dismissed as neocolonial meddling; however, SADC is careful not to alienate 
western donors too much, as many SADC projects are dependent on funding from European 
and American development funds. 
2.4 Institutional features
With the signing of the Amended Treaty in 2001, there are now eight SADC institutions, namely: 
(1) The Summit of Heads of State and Government 
(2) The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
(3) The Council of Ministers
(4) Ministerial Committees (sectoral) 
(5) The SADC Tribunal (currently suspended)
(6) The Standing Committee of Senior Officials
(7) SADC National Committees
(8) The SADC Secretariat
The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF) is an institution linked to SADC but not part of it. 
Figure 2 visualizes the institutional structure of SADC. We will discuss each institution in turn, 
including the SADC PF because of its relevance for the topic of this report. 
 
The Summit consists of the heads of state of all member states and is the supreme policy-
making institution of SADC, responsible for the direction of policy and control of functions. 
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All decision-making occurs through consensus. The Summit meets at least once a year, usually 
in August or September, in one of the member states. Extra-ordinary summits are held as 
and when necessary. The Summit operates on a troika system, with a current chairperson, an 
incoming chairperson (or deputy chair), and an outgoing chairperson, who advises the current 
and deputy chair. Every year the Summit elects an incoming chair from among its ranks. Each 
position is held for one year. 
The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is a mechanism for conflict prevention, conflict 
management, resolution, and peace-building. Its key objectives relate to military and defense 
issues, crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy, human rights, and democracy. Like the 
Summit, the Organ’s authority is exercised based on the troika system. The Summit troika and 
Organ troika consist of different serving heads of state, so at any given time there are six heads of 
state serving in the “double troika.” The Summit elects the chairperson and deputy chairperson 
of the Organ on a yearly basis. The Organ must obtain approval from the Summit for its 
actions before carrying them out. This system has been in place since 2001, with the signing 
of the Protocol on the Organ (prior to this point, Robert Mugabe was the Organ’s long-serving 
chairperson). Decision-making takes place by consensus (Article 8-c). In a conflict situation, it is 
not expected that all member states act in concert; action may involve a coalition of the willing 
under the SADC banner. The Organ operates at Summit, ministerial, and technical levels, and it 
cooperates with the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), a former substructure 
of the Frontline States (cf. supra). 
The Council of Ministers is composed of ministers from each member state, usually from 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (in which case there may be some overlap with the Organ’s 
Committee of Ministers), Economic Development, Justice, Planning, or Finance. The Council 
is responsible for supervising and monitoring the functions and development of SADC and 
ensuring that policies are properly implemented, as well as making recommendations to the 
Summit. The Council meets before the Summit and at least one other time during the year. It 
is chaired by the same country that currently chairs SADC. 
The Standing Committee of Senior Officials consists of one Permanent/Principal Secretary 
from each member state. This Committee is a technical advisory committee to Council and 
meets in advance of Council. It is chaired by the same country that chairs SADC. 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers is the institution aimed at ensuring policy guidance, 
coordination, and the harmonization of cross-sectoral activities. It comprises at least two 
ministers from each member state and reports to the Council of Ministers. 
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Figure 2: Institutional structure of SADC
SADC National Committees (SNC) are composed of key stakeholders including “government, 
private sector, civil society, non-governmental organizations; and workers and employers 
organizations” in the SADC member states (SADC Treaty 2001: Article 16). Their main purpose 
is to “ensure broad and effective participation” by key stakeholders in policy formulation 
and implementation (SADC Secretariat 2001). The Committees are also responsible for the 
initiation, implementation, and monitoring of projects. Technical subcommittees deal with 
specific matters such as the Employment and Labour Sector (ELS) Committee (see 3.2.4 for 
further details).
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The Tribunal is the judicial arm of SADC. Established in 1992 by Article 9 of the SADC Treaty, 
it consists of 10 judges nominated by member states and recommended by the Council to 
the Summit, which then appoints them to the bench. According to Article 16, the Tribunal 
should ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty 
and subsidiary instruments, and adjudicate upon disputes referred to it. In order to bring a case 
before the court, there must be an averment that a member state has violated SADC law and 
that the applicant (plaintiff) has exhausted all courts at the national level. The Tribunal was not 
operational until 2005. It heard its first case in 2007 and has made 18 rulings since. Cases heard 
in the Tribunal tend to fall into one of three categories: 
• Individuals versus SADC itself (employment issues) 
• Individuals versus member states (human rights issues)
• Incorporated companies versus member states (commercial issues)
However, the Tribunal’s operations have been suspended since May 2010 (see 3.2.3 for further 
details). 
The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC and is responsible for strategic 
planning, coordination and management of SADC programs, and implementation of the regional 
strategic plan. It is also mandated with promoting cooperation with external organizations and 
organizing SADC’s diplomatic representation (Adelmann 2009). Aside from the Tribunal (and 
the SADC PF), it is the only institution of SADC with a permanent institutional structure and 
administration at a given location. The Executive Secretary (currently Stergomena Lawrence 
Tax from Tanzania) is its most senior official and has the power to negotiate and sign treaties 
on behalf of SADC. 
Until 2001, each member state was responsible for a different sector. Tanzania, for instance, 
was responsible for Trade and Industry, Zimbabwe for Agriculture, Mauritius for Tourism, and 
South Africa for Investment and Finance. There were two drawbacks to this arrangement of 
decentralized Sectoral Coordinating Units. First, the sectors did not move at the same pace 
because “depending on the resources that countries would put in those sectors, they would 
either run with it or walk with it” (interview PR). Inter-sectoral linkages were weak or absent. 
Second, the Summit found in 2001 that 80 percent of the 470 project proposals had a strong 
national character, and only a minority could be considered regional projects in line with the 
strategic goals of SADC (SADC Secretariat 2001). In order to address these concerns, SADC 
adopted a more centralized approach in 2001, through which the 21 coordinating units were 
grouped into six Directorates, now located at the Secretariat in Gaborone: 
(1) Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI)
(2) Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR)
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(3) Infrastructure and Services (I&S)
(4) Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (SHD&SP)
(5) Politics and Diplomacy
(6) Defence and Security
The SHD&SP receives the biggest chunk of the SADC budget (see Table 3). Health and education 
are seen as central to human development in the region, and most of the Directorate’s energy 
is focused in these two areas.
Table 3: Allocation of SADC budget 2011–20124 
Sector Percentage of Budget
Social Human Development and Special Projects 32.94
Infrastructure and Services 16.87
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources 15.92
Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment 12.97
The Organ 12.21
Policy Planning and Resource Mobilization 5.87
The Tribunal 1.8
Gender 1.23
Macro-economic Surveillance 0.19
The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF) was established in 1996 as an autonomous 
institution. It serves as a regional platform for the national parliaments. The plenary assembly 
is comprised of four representatives elected by each national parliament. It was designed 
by the Summit as a consultative forum to exchange experiences and best practices. The 
parliamentarians, however, want to transform the Forum into a regional parliament in order to 
“spread a culture of human rights and gender equality, as well as good governance, transparency 
and accountability,” which would consolidate democracy in the SADC region (SADC Secretariat 
2004). In 2003, it submitted to the Summit a motivation document titled “The Case for a SADC 
Parliament” along with a “Draft Agreement Amending the Treaty” and a “Draft Protocol on 
the SADC Parliament.” At its 2004 meeting, the Summit rejected the proposal to establish a 
SADC Parliament but “encouraged the continuation of the SADC PF” (SADC Secretariat 2004). 
According to Prega Ramsamy, former Executive Secretary of SADC, SADC did not need a 
regional parliament at the time, as it was still an intergovernmental organization. The PF could 
bring its issues to the Pan-African Parliament of the AU. Establishing a regional parliament was 
considered premature, and in any case, SADC did not have sufficient resources to fund such a 
regional parliament (interview PR). 
4 Source: own compilation based on data from SADC Media Briefing on Outcome of the Meeting of 
SADC Council of Ministers, March 2011.
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The SADC PF arguably has a vested interest in promoting democratization in the region since it 
encompasses parliamentarians from all parties, including the opposition. For the same reason, 
representatives of SADC member states view it with suspicion, hence the tension between the 
PF and SADC executive (Matlosa 2004). The Summit has stated that “the idea of establishing 
SADC Parliament may be considered in the distant future” (SADC Secretariat 2004). The topic 
has since remained off the agenda. In section 3, this paper will discuss the competition and 
collaboration between the SADC PF and SADC in relation to election monitoring.
2.5 Location and Resources
The SADC Secretariat is located in Gaborone, Botswana, while the Parliamentary Forum and 
Tribunal are located about 1,000 km away in Windhoek, Namibia.
The total budget available to SADC has increased steadily in recent years despite the impact of 
the economic recession. SADC relies on contributions from Member States and grants from 
international cooperation partners (see Table 4). 
Table 4:  SADC budget, US $, millions5 
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Contributions from 
member states 14.8 16.5 26.0 24.77 25.0 29.3 32.0
Contributions from 
foreign donors and/
or grants
22.7 24.0 19.35 25.11 28.0 47.0 51.5
Total budget 37.5 40.5 45.35 49.0 53.0 76.3 83.5
Until 2003, member states made equal contributions to SADC institutions. From April 2003 
onward, their contributions have taken into account the relative gross domestic products, 
forming the basis of a more equitable and sustainable system. Funding from development 
partners consistently makes up more than half of the SADC budget. In order to address the 
overreliance on external funding, the Council of Ministers has proposed the creation of 
a Resource Mobilization Strategy and an SADC Development Fund. Since taking over the 
SADC Chairmanship in August 2011, Angola has vowed to “try to put [the] Development Fund 
into operation in order to respond to severe political and economic challenges faced by the 
Community” (Angolan Minister for Foreign Affairs Georges Chikoti, address to the SADC 
Summit, August 17, 2011). As of November 2013, progress is being made and the Fund is schedules 
to become operational in 2014.
5 Source: own compilation, based on data from the SADC Media Briefing on Outcome of the Meeting 
of SADC Council of Ministers March 2011, as well as allAfrica.com, Lusaka Times, SADC Today, SADC 
Council and Summit Records.
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As of February 2010, SADC staff numbered 213. There were 183 employees at the Secretariat; 13 
at the Tribunal (although many have not had their contracts renewed because of the Tribunal’s 
suspension); and 17 at the SADC Plant Genetic Resources Centre in Lusaka, Zambia. Despite the 
steady increase in staff numbers and the overall budget available, SADC suffers from a chronic 
lack of resources and staff, which stunts the organization’s capacity to implement decisions 
(Adelmann 2009). 
3. Mapping Governance Transfer by SADC
3.1 The Framework of Governance Transfer: Prescription and Policy 
SADC has three key documents: the Treaty (1992; 2001), the Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP, 2003), and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO, 2004). 
The RISDP and SIPO are the broad strategy documents that cover all policy domains. We have 
reviewed these documents looking for standards in the realm of good governance.
More specific rules have been elaborated in issue-specific protocols. A SADC Protocol has the 
same legal force as the Treaty itself; it comes into force 30 days after ratification by two-thirds 
of SADC member states, and it is binding only for the states that have ratified it. We have 
reviewed all SADC protocols. Six protocols turned out to contain relevant information: the 
Protocol against Corruption (SADC 2001-b), the Protocol on Gender and Development (SADC 
2008), the Protocol on Finance and Investment (SADC 2006), the Protocol on Mining (SADC 
1997-c), the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC 2001-c), and the 
Protocol on Tourism (SADC 1998-b).6 Finally, we have searched secondary literature and the 
SADC library (both online and in Gaborone) for references to other documents that potentially 
include elements of governance transfer. This search has yielded a Charter (SADC 2003-a), a 
Code (SADC 1997-a), a Declaration (SADC 1997-b) and an Addendum to the Declaration (SADC 
1998-a), which we have included in our database. As a result, the following fifteen documents 
have been identified as sources of governance transfer in SADC and have been scrutinized for 
standards and provisions related to aspects of human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and 
good governance (see Table 5). We will discuss the documents in chronological order.
6 We could not find relevant references in the protocols on Combating Illicit Drugs; Control of 
Firearms; Culture, Information and Sport; Education and Training; Energy; Extradition; Facilitation 
of Movement of Persons; Fisheries; Forestry; Health; Immunities and Privileges; Legal Affairs; Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters; Shared Watercourse Systems; Trade; Trade in Services; Transport, 
Communications and Meteorology; Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof; Wildlife Conservation 
and Law Enforcement. 
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Table 5: Governance transfer by SADC: standards and policies7
Year Title
Human 
Rights
Democracy
Rule of 
Law
Good 
Governance
1992 Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community
X X X
1997 Code on HIV/AIDS and 
Employment in SADC
X
1997 Protocol on Mining X
1997 Declaration on Gender and 
Development
X X
1998 Addendum on the Prevention and 
Eradication of Violence Against 
Women and Children
X
1998 Protocol on Tourism X
2001 Agreement Amending the Treaty 
of SADC
X X X
2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation
X X X
2001 Protocol against Corruption X X
2003 Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP)
X X X X
2003 Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights in SADC
X
2004 Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ (SIPO)
X X X X
2004 Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections
X X X X
2006 Finance and Investment Protocol X
2008 Protocol on Gender and 
Development 
X X X
1992 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
In 1992, the heads of state and government signed the Treaty establishing the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC 1992) in Windhoek, Namibia. The Treaty entered into force 
in September 1993 after ratification by two-thirds of the member states. It defines SADC’s main 
objectives as (1) the alleviation of poverty through development and economic growth and (2) 
the promotion of peace and security.
7 Source: own compilation. In bold, the four key documents.
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The Treaty makes no reference to the concept of good governance except for the implicit objective 
of inclusive governance; SADC shall “encourage the people of the Region and their institutions 
… to participate fully in the implementation of the programs and projects of SADC” (Article 5) 
and “shall seek to involve fully, the people of the Region and non-governmental organizations 
in the process of regional integration” (Article 23). The rule of law, human rights, and democracy 
are mentioned as principles that should guide SADC and its member states (Article 4), but there 
is no further definition of what these principles entail.
Given the roots of SADC in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, the specific reference 
to human rights in the context of non-discrimination should not come as a surprise: 
“SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds 
of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability, 
or such other ground as may be determined by the Summit.”  (SADC 1992: Article 6) 
Regarding democracy, SADC is “[m]indful of the need to involve the people of the Region 
centrally in the process of development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of 
democratic rights” (Preamble). Democracy seems to be one of SADC’s implicit objectives, as the 
organization shall “evolve common political values, systems and institutions” (Article 5) without 
specifying which political values, systems, or institutions.
In general, the standards formulated in the Treaty remain highly abstract. Member states pledge 
“to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC” (SADC 
1992: Article 6), but the question of which measures would be adequate is left open. Article 22 
stipulates that member states shall conclude a protocol for each area of cooperation, spelling 
out the objectives and institutional mechanisms for the specific area. Starting in 1992, protocols 
for several cooperation areas were approved (see above). However, good governance, rule of law, 
democracy, and human rights were not defined as areas of cooperation; therefore, no protocol 
was elaborated on the promotion of these principles. 
The Treaty establishes a Tribunal to ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of the 
Treaty’s provisions and to adjudicate upon disputes (Article 16). As such, the Tribunal is an 
instrument for the interpretation and enforcement of the principles of the rule of law, human 
rights, and democracy as articulated in the Treaty. A later protocol would determine its 
composition, powers, functions, and procedures. For more details on the functioning of the 
Tribunal, see Section 3.2. 
The Treaty allows the Summit to impose sanctions against a member state that “persistently fails, 
without good reason, to fulfill obligations assumed under this Treaty” or “implements policies 
which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC” (Article 33). It does not specify which 
type of sanctions, but theoretically enables the Summit to enact sanctions against a member 
state that persistently violates the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
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In short, in spite of SADC’s roots in the liberation struggles and the democratization of the 
region, its founding treaty is limited with regard to governance transfer. It does not even include 
membership conditionality. It should be noted that in 1992, South Africa was not yet a member 
of SADC. Three months after the first truly national South African elections in April 1994, 
Mandela-led South Africa joined the organization and started to play a key role in governance 
transfer.
1997 Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment in SADC
In the 1990s, most SADC member states were severely hit by the AIDS/HIV epidemic, with grave 
economic and social consequences. In 1994, a group of NGOs and trade unions in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe started to mobilize and demand the development of a regional code on HIV/
AIDS and employment because of the regional nature of the epidemic and the reluctance of 
national governments to take action for fear of their reputations. The initiative was taken up 
by the tripartite SADC Employment and Labour Sector (ELS) committee. In 1997, the Council 
adopted the Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment in SADC as a non-binding document (SADC 
Council of Ministers 1997). It has become a reference point in national codes and business 
codes.
The Code frames HIV/AIDS as a major health problem with employment, economic, and 
human rights implications. It is based on fundamental human rights principles, aiming to 
protect the rights of employees with HIV/AIDS and related diseases through the principle of 
non-discrimination between individuals with and without HIV/AIDS, and between HIV/AIDS-
infected employees and employees with other life-threatening illnesses. SADC member states 
should coordinate their policies to combat HIV/AIDS and ensure consistency with the Code’s 
non-discrimination principle. They should collect, share, and disseminate data on HIV/AIDS. 
Implementation of the Code should be monitored by the ELS and tripartite committees in the 
member states.
The non-binding Code was the first document in a series of policy initiatives at the regional 
level. The SADC Protocol on Health (approved by the Summit in 1999) made the policy 
recommendations contained in the Code binding for all member states. In 2003, the SADC 
Summit even agreed that combating HIV/AIDS should be one of SADC’s main priorities (Maseru 
Declaration). However, in the framework of governance transfer, these policies are only relevant 
insofar as they extend the non-discrimination principle to individuals with health problems. 
For that reason, we will not discuss them further here.
1997 Protocol on Mining
The Summit adopted the Protocol on Mining in 1997 with the aim of ensuring that the 
exploitation of mineral resources would benefit the Southern African people and contribute 
to raising their living standards (SADC 1997-b). Given the appalling working conditions in the 
mining sector, the lack of attention to labor conditions in the protocol is striking. In Article 
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2, the Protocol stipulates that “Member States shall promote economic empowerment of the 
historically disadvantaged in the mining sector.” In Article 1, “historically disadvantaged” is 
defined as disabled people, women, and indigenous people. The Protocol does not contain 
measures regarding the promotion of this standard.
1997 Declaration on Gender and Development (GAD)
The “rebirth” of SADC in 1992 coincided with preparations for the UN Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing in 1995. Southern African women’s organizations and women from 
government gender units set up a regional task force to represent the demands of the region 
in Beijing. The SADC Secretariat developed a policy document to stipulate how gender issues 
could be incorporated into regional policies. This SADC Gender Programme was approved 
by the Council of Ministers. Subsequently, in September 1997, the SADC Summit signed the 
Gender and Development Declaration (SADC 1997-a) to endorse the Council’s decision on the 
gender program. The Declaration is a brief, non-binding document.
The Declaration recognizes gender equality as a fundamental human right. It elaborates 
on Article 6 of the SADC Treaty, the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of gender 
following the standards set in relevant UN documents.8 SADC member states should ensure 
the “eradication of all gender inequalities in the region” and protect and promote the human 
rights of women and children. The reproductive and sexual rights of women and girls are 
considered human rights and should be recognized, protected, and promoted. In 1997, the 
protection and promotion of sexual rights was a new issue worldwide, and its early acceptance 
by SADC can be explained as a reaction to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
women are at a greater risk of HIV infection than men because of their economic and cultural 
subordination (Klugman 2000: 147). Thus, gender equality in terms of sexual rights is seen as 
crucial in successfully addressing both poverty and HIV/AIDS.
Member states shall repeal and reform “all laws, constitutions and social practices which 
still subject women to discrimination” and enact “gender sensitive laws” (Article 8). This is 
interesting because the Declaration aims to reform not only written sources of discrimination 
but also discriminatory “social practices.” Moreover, the enactment of gender-sensitive laws is 
a far-reaching commitment that clearly reflects the Beijing concept of gender mainstreaming, 
in the sense that gender effects must be taken into account in every domain. The Declaration 
commits member states to adopt an integrated approach to address the issue of violence against 
women; to that end, the mass media should “disseminate information and materials in respect 
of the human rights of women and children” (SADC 1997-a). The Declaration contains a single 
concrete target, namely for the representation of women in politics and decision-making, 
setting a minimum of 30 percent by 2005. 
8 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 
Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies, the Africa Platform of Action, the Beijing Declaration, and the 
Beijing Platform for Action.
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As for the promotion of these standards, the Declaration requires a regional institutional 
framework for mainstreaming gender issues into all SADC activities through the involvement 
of governmental and non-governmental actors at the regional and national levels. The SADC 
Secretariat should act as coordinator. To this effect, the Declaration establishes a Gender 
Unit consisting of two officers in the Secretariat, as well as Gender Focal Points in all sector 
secretariats (which were still dispersed among all member states until the treaty revision in 
2001). Their task is “to ensure that gender is taken into account in all sectoral initiatives, and 
is placed on the agenda of all ministerial meetings” (SADC 1997-a). The Declaration makes a 
standing committee of ministers for gender affairs politically responsible for gender issues at 
the regional level. The ministers shall receive advice from an advisory committee consisting of 
one representative from government and one member from NGOs in each member state.
1998 The Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children. An Addendum to 
the 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development by SADC Heads of State and Government
After the adoption of the Declaration, a SADC Conference on the prevention of violence against 
women was convened by the Ministers of Justice, Ministers of Gender/Women’s Affairs and 
representatives of NGOs. At this conference, a series of specific measures were proposed to tackle 
the problem of violence against women. The measures were collected in a three-page document 
that gained approval by the Summit in September 1998 (SADC 1998-a). The Addendum is an 
integral part of the 1997 Gender and Development Declaration. 
Violence against women and children is condemned here as a “serious violation of fundamental 
human rights.” The Addendum mainly addresses the national level and calls upon the member 
states to adopt a series of legal, social, economic, cultural, and political measures to provide 
services (legal aid, health, and statistics) and allocate the necessary resources. SADC activities are 
broadly defined as an obligation to adopt “policies, programmes and mechanisms to enhance 
security and empowerment of women and children” and monitor their implementation. SADC 
is also asked “to give urgent consideration” to the adoption of legally binding SADC instruments 
on “Prevention of Violence against Women and Children.” Before the end of the year 2000, 
SADC should convene a regional conference to review progress made in the implementation of 
the measures by the member states.
In order to make tangible the commitments contained in the Declaration and the Addendum, 
the SADC Gender Unit submitted a policy framework in 1999, which was then adopted by the 
SADC ministries responsible for Gender/Women’s Affairs: the SADC Gender Plan of Action. 
1998 Protocol on Tourism
In 1998, the member states adopted the Protocol on Tourism, which aims “to use tourism 
as a vehicle to achieve sustainable social and economic development” (SADC 1998-b: Article 
2). The protocol states in Article 3.7 that member states “shall promote a culture of human 
rights, gender sensitivity and be responsive to the requirements and involvement of people 
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with disability.” In this article, three disparate concepts have been lumped together without 
further elaboration. The protocol does not contain any instruments to promote the standards 
contained in the article or fulfill the more “technical” requirement of ensuring access for people 
with disabilities. It introduces the novel and potentially far-reaching idea of promoting “gender 
sensitivity” without exploring what this would entail in the context of tourism (e.g., a ban on sex 
tourism?), and declines to elaborate on the noble idea of promoting a “culture” of human rights. 
It does not specify what member states should do.
2001 Agreement Amending the Treaty of SADC 
In March 2001, the Council recorded with dismay that more than four years after the decision 
to create the Organ, SADC was still unable to make it fully operational. This failure was seen as 
hampering SADC’s abilities to “address the ongoing instability and conflicts in the region in a 
coordinated and coherent manner” (SADC Secretariat 2001). The Treaty was amended in 2001 
mainly to settle the dispute over relations between SADC and the Organ. In addition, the treaty 
revision process was used as an opportunity for major institutional reform. In order to improve 
SADC policymaking capacities, the decentralized sectoral units in the different capitals were 
reorganized into directorates under the SADC Secretariat and all moved to Gaborone. The 
Agreement Amending the Treaty of SADC was signed by the heads of state and government at 
an extra-ordinary Summit meeting on August 14, 2001 in Blantyre, Malawi, and entered into 
force on the same day (SADC 2001-a). 
To the original treaty’s rather vague objective that SADC shall aim to “promote common 
political values, systems and other shared values,” the new agreement adds the modifier, “which 
are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective” (Article 5). 
Also, democracy becomes an explicit objective; SADC shall “consolidate, defend and maintain 
democracy” (Article 5), though the document does not specify what it means by “democracy” or 
how SADC will defend it. The idea of more inclusive governance, which was touched upon in the 
original treaty, gains strength with the establishment of a new institution, the SADC National 
Committees (SNC). These consist of key stakeholders including government, the private sector, 
civil society and non-governmental organizations, and workers’ and employers’ organizations, 
and shall provide input on the formulation of SADC policies and oversee their implementation 
(Article 16). 
2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 
Article 9 of the amended treaty established the Organ as one of SADC’s institutions. This 
Protocol specifies its functions and procedures. Given the history of the Organ, it is no surprise 
that the Protocol focuses on coordination between the Organ, its chairperson, the troika, and 
the ministerial committees on the one hand and SADC institutions on the other. The Protocol 
was approved by the Summit on August 14, 2001 in Blantyre (SADC 2001-c). It became legally 
binding in the states party to it when Zimbabwe ratified the protocol in 2004 as the ninth 
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member state. Angola and DRC have signed but not ratified; Madagascar has not signed or 
ratified.
The general objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security, and in this sense it embodies 
SADC’s second objective next to poverty eradication. This objective includes protecting the 
people of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, promoting 
the development of democratic institutions and practices, and observing universal human rights 
(Article 2). The standards prescribed primarily center on the strict respect for sovereignty, non-
interference, and non-aggression: “Member states shall refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (Article 11). Regarding 
human rights standards, the protocol refers to the standards in the Charter and Conventions 
of the AU and UN (Article 2-g).
The Organ may seek to resolve an intra-state conflict in case of “large-scale violence between 
sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population including 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights” or of “a military coup or other 
threat to the legitimate authority of a State” (Article 11-2). In Article 11-3, the Protocol outlines 
the methods and procedures to be utilized in such cases, ranging from preventive diplomacy, 
negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, and arbitration to adjudication by an 
international tribunal. In these situations, the Organ shall seek to obtain the consent of the 
disputant parties to its mediation efforts. If peaceful means are unsuccessful, the Chairperson 
of the Organ “may recommend to the Summit that enforcement action be taken,” but “the 
Summit shall resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and, in accordance 
with article 53 of the UN Charter, only with the authorization of the UN Security Council” 
(Article 11-3). 
The Organ was told to establish an early warning system to monitor early signs of conflict and 
negative socioeconomic developments in the region “in order to facilitate timeous action to 
prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict” (Article 11-3-b). A team of experts developed a 
set of Insecurity and Conflict Indicators, which was approved by the ISDSC in July 2006. The 
launch of the Regional Early Warning Center (REWC) was delayed for some time by limited 
human capacity and financial resources, but eventually, in July 2010, Mozambican President 
Armando Guebuza conducted its official inauguration (Daily News, 14 July 2010). The REWC 
is linked to the National Focal Points created in all member states with the aim of conveying 
information to the REWC on developments within each state. 
The Protocol does not call for the establishment of the SADC Standby Force (SSF), which 
formally falls under the African Union’s framework of regionally based peace-keeping forces as 
the building blocks of an African Standby Force. However, the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) establishing the SADC SSF refers to this protocol and thereby gives it a formal place 
within SADC structure. The SADC Summit agreed in 2004 to establish a SADC peacekeeping 
force, predating the AU’s initiative by several years (Cilliers and Malan 2005: 12). In 2005, the SADC 
Council of Ministers decided that the SSF would “consist of a Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) 
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comprising of military and a SADC Civilian Police (SADC CIVPOL) as approved by the Organ 
Troika” (SADC Secretariat 2005). The SSF would be managed on a day-to-day basis by a Planning 
Element located at the Secretariat in Gaborone. By August 2006, the Permanent Planning 
Element consisting of five officers responsible for SADCBRIG and three for SADC CIVPOL had 
been fully deployed to the Secretariat (Report on the Activities of the Organ 2005/2006, SADC 
Secretariat 2006, Annex). As of October 2010, seventeen of eighteen posts had been filled. 
The SADCBRIG was officially launched at the SADC Summit meeting on August 17, 2007. 
Article 5-d of the MoU states that the SADCBRIG should protect human rights. It “shall only 
be deployed on the authority of the SADC Summit” (Article 7). Hendricks and Musavengana 
suggest that it would be problematic if the sole authority to deploy force rested with the SADC 
Summit; since it may be difficult for the Summit to reach a consensus on whether to deploy the 
SSF, they argue, in the interests of good governance, this authority should reside with the AU 
Peace and Security Council (2010: 24). Although the Protocol does not actually state it explicitly, 
previous incidents and the salience of the norm of nonintervention in the region’s political 
culture suggest that military interventions will only take place at the invitation of a recognized 
head of state, with the aim of upholding a government. The practice of (non)intervention and 
the functioning of the Early Warning System will be discussed in section 3.2. 
2001 Protocol against Corruption 
The SADC Protocol Against Corruption was adopted by the SADC Heads of State at the August 
2001 Summit (SADC 2001-b). It was the first sub-continental, anti-corruption treaty in Africa. 
The Protocol was signed by all fourteen member states (Madagascar was not yet a member). It 
entered into force on July 6, 2005, thirty days after its ratification by two thirds of the member 
states, and became binding for all member states that had ratified it (all except Madagascar and 
the Seychelles).
For the first time, the concept of “good governance” appears in an SADC document. In the 
Preamble, SADC Heads of State acknowledge that corruption “undermines good governance 
which includes the principles of accountability and transparency.” Corruption 
“includes bribery or any other behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with 
responsibilities in the public and private sectors which violates their duties as 
public officials, private employees, independent agents or other relationships of 
that kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for themselves or 
others.” (Article 1)
The Protocol’s objective is to eradicate corruption in the public and private sectors. It establishes 
a regional Committee with state representatives to collect information, organize training 
programs, provide assistance to member states, and monitor the implementation of the 
Protocol (Article 11). Implementation itself is a purely national affair, which might be explained 
by the high level of corruption in SADC member states and their fear of being shamed. Member 
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states have to develop “standards of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper fulfillment 
of public functions as well as mechanisms to enforce those standards” (Article 4-a). They must 
adopt measures ensuring the transparency, equity, and efficiency of systems of government 
hiring and procurement of goods and services (Article 4-b). The concern with increasing input 
legitimacy is visible in the commitment by member states “to adopt measures, which will create, 
maintain and strengthen ... mechanisms to encourage participation by the media, civil society 
and nongovernmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption” (Article 4-i). 
2003 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)
In the course of reviewing the operations of its institutions, a process that began in 1999, SADC 
increasingly recognized the necessity of an overall regional strategy. The SADC Secretariat took 
the lead, seconded by national officials, and several drafts were discussed at regional workshops 
and by the newly established SADC National Committees. In 2003, the Summit (SADC 2003-
b) endorsed the RISDP. The RISDP is not a legally binding agreement, but “it enjoys political 
legitimacy” (Tralac 2012). It offers a broad framework and indicates the topics for which a 
protocol should be negotiated among all stakeholders and adopted by the Summit. The RISDP 
refers to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the UN General Assembly, the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 
and most prominently the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
At the RISDP’s launch in 2004, Benjamin William Mkapa, then president of Tanzania and 
Chairperson of SADC, outlined how sustainable economic growth alone is not sufficient to reduce 
poverty. Investment in human capital is needed, including investment in healthcare, education, 
and gender equality, along with good governance, “which calls for participation, transparency, 
accountability and predictability, facilitates effective formulation and implementation of 
policies as well as sound macroeconomic management” (SADC Secretariat 2004). Good 
governance is considered instrumental for the effective functioning of SADC and the goal of 
poverty reduction. The 163-page document makes many references to “good governance” as one 
of the “key integration and development enablers.” Business comes into focus as well, since 
“good political, economic and corporate governance are prerequisites for sustainable socio-
economic development” (SADC 2003-b: 4-5). The RISDP also defines bad governance, including 
unequal distribution of political power, corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, 
and inefficient bureaucracies (SADC 2003-b: 17). Upholding the rule of law (a “transparent legal 
system”) also stands out as a necessary condition to attract investments (SADC 2003-b: 78). 
Public resource management should become more accountable and transparent in order to 
attract investment (SADC 2003-b: 75). The RISDP asks member states to implement NEPAD 
standards in accounting and auditing—issues that are further elaborated in the 2006 Protocol 
on Finance and Investment.
Regarding human rights, the RISDP pays extensive attention to women’s rights, repeating 
the aims of the 1997 Declaration on Gender. Gender equality is predominately presented as 
instrumental to achieving economic development and poverty eradication. SADC calls upon 
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member states to integrate a gender perspective into all national policies, programs, and 
activities (gender mainstreaming), and to adopt specific measures to address the constraints 
that women face (affirmative action). The RISDP itself applies gender mainstreaming, as 
gender issues pop up in all policy areas including mining, energy, trade, fisheries, and water 
management, to name a few. 
Democracy is highlighted in this document as an essential part of the region’s “promising 
future.” Effective, legitimate, and democratic institutions are considered necessary to promote 
shared values and enable integration and development (RISDP 2003: 4-5). In the RISDP, the 
promotion of democracy does not center on elections (a domain of the Organ) but rather on 
the participation of stakeholders in decision-making and the involvement of civil society in 
“community building at both regional and national levels” (SADC 2003-b: 6; 56). The RISDP 
itself constituted an exercise in democracy, for it was 
“guided by a participatory approach through which extensive consultations 
took place in all SADC Member States. Government agencies, the private 
sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society, academic and 
research institutions, International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) and many other 
stakeholders contributed to this process. The exercise was overseen by SADC 
Council of Ministers through the Integrated Committee of Ministers.”  (SADC 
2003-b, Acknowledgements) 
One drawback to this participatory approach is that the classic checks and balances between the 
legislative and the executive are distorted, as parliaments must remain at a distance. National 
parliaments have no role in SADC policy formulation or implementation, which has resulted 
in complaints by national parliamentarians of being left in the dark about regional integration 
policies (Saurombe 2009). 
The implementation of the RISDP should take place through a multilayered participatory 
approach. The RISDP provides the broad framework; the stakeholders will draw up detailed 
implementation plans for each program, “clearly spelling out issues such as who the different 
actors are, implementation and management roles, benchmarks, and sustainability” (SADC 
2003-b: 84), as well as targets and timeframes. The Secretariat will coordinate and monitor 
implementation at the regional level, while the SADC National Committees (SNCs) will take 
charge at the national level. These committees are tasked with ensuring broad and inclusive 
consultations and achieving consensus on SADC policies. The RISDP explicitly addresses the 
private sector and NGOs as stakeholders (SADC 2003-b: 88). At the regional level, the Summit 
and the Council of Ministers—through the Integrated Committee of Ministers—will monitor 
the process using the progress reports from the Secretariat, and provide political and strategic 
guidance. 
With respect to the actual adoption of measures, the RISDP expresses concern at the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, benchmarks, and concrete targets at the regional level, but it does 
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not propose the introduction of new ones. In a draft version of the RISDP, it was feared that 
the monitoring and evaluation process “may be seen as a punitive measure rather than a 
development tool” (SADC Secretariat 2003-b: 102). In the final version, this fear is not voiced. 
Instead, there is disappointment in the lack of progress so far and a concern about the weakness 
of good intentions without clear implementation measures.
2003 Charter on Fundamental Social Rights in SADC 
Article 5-2-a of the 1992 SADC Treaty states that SADC “shall harmonise political and socio-
economic policies and plans of Member States” in order to enhance the standard of living for 
the Southern African people. The Employment and Labour Sector (ELS)9 should elaborate the 
necessary policy measures to be enshrined at a later date in a new Protocol. The SADC Protocol 
on Trade (1996) did not deal with employment and labor issues, despite its obvious links to 
the subject. The powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) expressed its 
disappointment at this omission (Interview AC). The ELS then opted for a charter modeled on 
the European Social Charter (which was approved by the Council of Europe in 1961) instead 
of a protocol (Nkowani 2007: 44). A protocol is legally binding, but a charter is not and does 
not require ratification by member states. The Charter was the outcome of a drafting process 
that included experts from the ILO and representatives from trade unions, employers, and 
governments. It was formally adopted at the Summit in 2003 and entered into force on the same 
day (SADC 2003-a; Nkowani 2007: 43). Angola, Botswana and Madagascar have not signed it. 
Employment and Labour is the only SADC sector with a Charter instead of a protocol. In order 
to get it on the same “wavelength” as the other sectors, there is pressure to change the Charter’s 
status into a Protocol (Interview AC). 
The regional codification of social and labor rights became necessary because an awareness 
had developed that low labor standards have a negative impact on economic productivity and 
efficiency; one of the Charter’s key terms is “(increased) productivity” (Interview AC). Also, the 
Charter should prevent the weakening of workers’ rights. Due to the competition to attract 
foreign investment, a race to the bottom of social rights has emerged, “beggar-thy-neighbour 
investment incentive competition” as Zampini calls it (2008: 94).10 COSATU warned against 
eroding the “gains that we made in South Africa” if companies relocated to Lesotho, Mozambique, 
or Swaziland to avoid progressive, South African labor laws (COSATU 2003). The Charter
“embodies the recognition by governments, employers and workers in the 
Region of the universality and indivisibility of basic human rights proclaimed in 
instruments such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Constitution of the ILO, 
9 The ELS is the tripartite forum where labor ministers, employers, and trade unions meet to discuss the 
harmonization of labor standards and map out common strategies to be used in international forums 
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO).
10 In the Namibia Ramatex case (1995–2008), SADC member states were competing with each other for 
foreign investment and lost thousands of jobs (for details, see Zampini 2008: 99).
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the Philadelphia Declaration and other relevant international instruments. … 
Member States undertake to observe the basic rights referred to in this Charter.” 
(Article 3)
Listing the standards laid out in ILO Conventions, the Charter specifies social and economic 
rights for specific groups of workers, such as women (Article 6), children (Article 7), workers who 
have reached retirement age (Article 8), and people with disabilities (Article 9). Several articles 
are concerned with the fight against poverty. Article 10-2 entitles “persons who have been unable 
to either enter or re-enter the labour market and have no means of subsistence ... to receive 
sufficient resources and social assistance,” while Article 14 asks for wages “which provide for 
a decent standard of living.” Finally, according to Article 11-c, “the conditions of employment 
for every worker in the Region shall be stipulated in national law, a collective agreement or a 
contract of employment.” Regarding classic socioeconomic rights, “freedom of association, the 
right to organise and collective bargaining” (Article 4) should be guaranteed, and industrial 
and workplace democracy should be promoted by the member states (Article 13). Interestingly, 
these rights “shall apply to all areas, including export processing zones” (Article 4), although if 
implemented, this could reduce the attractiveness of the region to foreign investment.
The Charter does not contain deadlines or targets. SADC does not plan to develop its own 
standards or EU-style framework directives to harmonize occupational health and safety 
regulations. An often recurring formula in the Charter reads: “Member States shall create an 
enabling environment so that ...” This provision is vague, not calling for specific measures 
or instruments. However, the Charter is not completely devoid of meaning; it creates 
ongoing regional and national tripartite consultation processes on policy formulation and 
implementation. Based on consensus among all stakeholders, the process is mainly driven by 
workers’ representatives (Interview AC) through the Southern African Trade Union Coordination 
Council (SATUCC) in Gaborone, near SADC Headquarters. In addition, the ILO and the SADC 
Secretariat cooperate intensively (Zampini 2008). Responsibility for the implementation of the 
Charter lies with the national tripartite institutions and regional structures (Article 16-1). They 
shall “prevent non-implementation” and “submit regular progress reports to the Secretariat” 
(Article 16-2). Their effectiveness depends, of course, on the strength of the employers’ and 
workers’ organizations, as evidenced in the contrast between weak unionism in some countries 
(Lesotho, Zambia) and strong unionism in others (South Africa, Zimbabwe) (ILO 2008).
The Charter instructs member states to “take appropriate action to ratify and implement” the 
ILO conventions that they have already decided to prioritize. Every year, the ELS produces a table 
highlighting conventions not yet ratified and uses peer pressure to motivate the laggard states 
(Interview AC). The next step should ensure that the member states actually implement the 
conventions and introduce or improve national legislation. To that effect, the Charter calls for 
the establishment of a regional reporting mechanism (Article 5). So far, no uniform instrument 
exists to assess member states’ performances, but the ELS has established a committee in charge 
of its development. A mechanism of this kind will enable the ELS to “know what is happening 
in the member states.” It will also help the member states “to support each other at the ILO 
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level” and avoid harassment at the annual ILO conferences because of non-compliance with the 
ILO standards (Interview AC). If the instrument is approved, it will facilitate yearly assessment. 
For the time being, no comprehensive monitoring occurs, but the ELS does contribute to the 
SADC progress report every year. 
The main challenges that member states face in implementing the Charter are capacity 
constraints in terms of human resources, expertise, and financial resources (Interview AC). This 
explains the prominent role of the ILO. Working together, the ILO and the SADC Secretariat 
organize training sessions for the tripartite partners at the ILO Training Centre in Italy.
2004 Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ 
Not long after the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation was signed in 2001, 
a working group convened to draw up a plan to implement the Protocol’s objectives. The 
Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), a non-binding 50-page document, was endorsed 
by the Summit in August 2003 (SADC 2004-b). Its core goal is “to create a peaceful and stable 
political and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realize its socio-
economic objectives” (SADC 2004-b: 6). The SIPO aims to do three things: provide guidelines 
and strategies for action, shape the institutional framework for the day-to-day activities of the 
Organ, and align the regional security agenda with that of the AU (van Nieuwkerk 2007). 
The SIPO specifies the actions to be taken (without specifying by whom) to realize the objectives 
formulated in the Protocol. In the area of politics, Objective 2 “to promote ... the evolution of 
common political values and institutions” translates into strategies such as the promotion of 
public debates and awareness activities vis-à-vis the achievements of SADC, the introduction of 
SADC-related topics into school curricula, and the promotion of cultural and sporting events. 
The Hashim Mbita Project (see section 2), which records the liberation struggles of the region, 
is an example of one such activity. Regarding Objective 4, “to promote the development of 
democratic institutions and practices by State Parties and encourage the observance of universal 
human rights,” SIPO calls for the establishment of common electoral standards throughout 
the region, including a code of electoral conduct, and the establishment of an SADC Electoral 
Commission. These requests have resulted in the Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections (SADC 2004-a), including a code of conduct (see below). 
In the State Security Sector, Objective 1 “to protect the people and safeguard the Region against 
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order” translates into the very broad strategy 
“to promote the observance of human rights in security related issues.” In the Public Security 
Sector, SIPO also mentions combating human trafficking and combating and preventing rape, 
abuse, and violence against women and children. SIPO recommends developing a “culture of 
observance of the existing international provisions on Human Rights” (SADC 2004-b: 40). SIPO 
also proposes establishing a Regional Commission for the promotion of and respect for human 
rights, but this recommendation has not been followed, probably because of its potential overlap 
with the AU HR Commission. SIPO expresses misgiving about the activities of law enforcers—a 
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reasonable concern given the background of corruption and legal transgressions by domestic 
security forces in many SADC countries. Law enforcement officers should receive training 
on effective law and order maintenance strategies. Within the police services, professional 
accountability should become the norm. Defense forces should be professionalized through 
training programs, and civilian–military relations should be improved (although SIPO does not 
elaborate exactly how they might be improved).
Finally, regular reporting should occur, including a review of implementation and provision of 
information to stakeholders on a regular basis (SADC 2004-b: 45–46).
2004 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections
It is often observed that after the political transitions of the 1990s, SADC countries adopted 
the formal attributes of democracy without realizing substantive democracy. The danger of 
“electoralism,” where democracy is equated with the holding of elections, lurked in the 
background (Matlosa 2004). New steps were necessary for the consolidation of democracy, 
which SADC pursues both as a goal in itself (political participation as such is considered a good) 
and for instrumental reasons (a stable democratic order is seen as a prerequisite for sustainable 
economic growth) (SADC 2003-b). However, the causal relationship between democracy and 
economic growth has been reversed by research showing that a higher level of economic 
development in the SADC region is necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Breytenbach 
2002). The assumption that elections contribute to conflict management has been questioned as 
well, as elections in deeply divided, multi-ethnic countries11 often seem to exacerbate conflicts 
and political instability (Breytenbach 2002). Therefore, it is SADC’s role to “anticipate these 
[post-election] conflicts and put in place effective institutional mechanisms for constructively 
managing them” (Matlosa 2004: 10). 
Against this backdrop, the Summit adopted the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections (Principles, SADC 2004-a) in 2004. The document reflects the SIPO’s 
(SADC 2004-b) commitment to establishing common electoral standards in the region. The 
document is not binding and has not required ratification by the member states.
Strikingly, in the years preceding the adoption of the Principles, two similar sets of electoral 
standards had already been produced in the region: the SADC Parliamentary Forum’s 
Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region (2001) and the Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Electoral Commissions Forum’s Principles for 
Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in SADC (2003). EISA is a not-for-profit 
11  Angola, DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia are heterogeneous, 
multi-ethnic countries where all groups are minorities. Lesotho, Seychelles, and Swaziland are 
ethnically homogeneous, while the other countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and Zimbabwe) are 
multi-ethnic with one group as the majority (Breytenbach 2002). 
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organization established in 1996.12 The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC (SADC-ECF) 
is an independent entity that facilitates cooperation among the electoral authorities of the 
SADC member states. It was launched in July 1998 and is governed by a Constitution that 
mandates it to “strengthen co-operation amongst Electoral Commissions in the Southern 
African Development Community; Promote conditions conducive to free, fair and transparent 
elections in countries in the Southern African Development Community” (SADC ECF, 2009, 
Final Report on Malawi elections). The EISA/ECF principles were a joint initiative by the civil 
society organizations and the electoral commissions.
The SADC PF document seems to have directly motivated SADC to produce its own document 
(Interview PR). There are no major contradictions between the three documents, but they 
have not been combined in a single document because they have different constituencies. 
Given the role of opposition parliamentarians in the SADC PF and the relative autonomy 
of Electoral Commissions, SADC governments have preferred to develop their own set of 
standards at the regional level (Matlosa 2004). On election observation, the SADC Principles 
are less comprehensive than the SADC PF document, and on the technical issue of elections 
management, they are less comprehensive than the EISA/ECF document. The main value of the 
SADC Principles is that they represent the first time SADC heads of state and government have 
committed themselves to these principles. In spite of its title, the document elaborates more 
thoroughly on elections observation than elections management. Unfortunately, the Principles 
do not address institutional aspects of elections, such as the relative merits of first-past-the-
post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems. This is unfortunate because in 
deeply divided societies, the aim of political stability would warrant promoting the PR system, 
where opposition parties are ensured participation. In FPTP systems, legitimate opposition is 
“sidelined not by unfree elections, but by less representative electoral procedures” (Breytenbach 
2002: 90). 
The Principles are broadly aligned with those articulated in the African Union Declaration on 
the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, adopted by the 2002 AU Summit. 
The first component of the SADC Principles deals with the conduct of elections. It contains 
ten principles aimed at ensuring equal opportunities for all stakeholders, whether for political 
parties before and during the elections (freedom of association, transparent funding, access to 
media, impartiality of the judiciary, and electoral commissions) or for citizens (voter education, 
right to vote and be voted for, political tolerance). The member states are called upon to safeguard 
the basic human and civil liberties of all citizens, including the freedom of movement, assembly, 
association, and expression. Finally, the principles address the situation after the elections 
(acceptance of election results proclaimed free and fair by all parties, possibility of challenging 
results). Key to defending these rights is the independence of the judiciary and the impartiality 
of the electoral institutions. Member states holding elections are responsible for ensuring the 
peace and security of all. 
12 Financially supported by local, regional, and international funding organizations (homepage EISA, 
http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/donors.htm). 
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To enforce the observance of these principles, SADC Election Observer Missions (SEOMs) 
should be deployed. According to Article 3-1, 
“In the event a Member State deems it necessary to invite SADC to observe is 
elections, the SADC Electoral Observation Missions (SEOM) have an Observation 
role. The mandate of the Mission shall be based on the Treaty and the Protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.” 
The Organ is the body responsible for organizing observer missions. Upon request by the 
member state, the chairperson of the Organ officially constitutes the Mission (Article 3-2). The 
mission should be deployed two weeks before the elections. The Principles include a code of 
conduct for SADC election observers, along with a list of their rights and responsibilities (accept 
no gifts or favors, strict impartiality, produce a report within thirty days). Member states should 
establish impartial, national electoral bodies and competent legal entities including effective 
constitutional courts to arbitrate in the event of disputes (Article 7-3). The Principles do not 
indicate what to do when elections are deemed unfair. The next section of this paper discusses 
the actual conduct and outcomes of SEOMs.
2006 Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP)
SADC aims to achieve economic development through the establishment of a regional common 
market, which implies a harmonization of policies in the crucial domains of finance and 
investment. The Protocol was subject to lengthy negotiations between 1998 and 2006, when it 
was finally signed by all member states (SADC 2006). It entered into force on April 16, 2010 after 
nine member states had ratified. The comprehensive protocol (112 pages including annexes) is 
only relevant to the topic of this report because it mentions in Annex 2 (on macro-economic 
convergence) that the signatories are “DEDICATED to good governance, accountable and 
transparent public resource management” (Protocol, Annex 2, 37). The Annex does not further 
specify standards or policies related to this topic.
2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development (SADC Gender Protocol)
In 2005, for the tenth anniversary of the Beijing World Conference on Women, the Gender Unit 
of the SADC Secretariat conducted a “Gender Audit” to measure progress in implementing the 
Gender and Development Declaration (GAD). The Audit found that “governments had failed to 
deliver on the one concrete target in the Declaration—achieving 30 percent women in decision-
making” (Gender Links 2008). It also called for new binding instruments. If adopted, a protocol 
would oblige member states to amend their laws in order to ensure equal rights for women 
across a wide range of issues. Following the Gender Audit, the Council approved upgrading 
the GAD into a Protocol, but the “Summit decided it was not as yet an opportune time” to 
do so (SADC Secretariat 2006). Nonetheless, Magdaline Mathiba-Madibela, head of the Gender 
Unit, started developing a Draft Protocol in collaboration with member states and other key 
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stakeholders such as legal and gender experts. Sixteen regional and national NGOs13 working 
to promote women’s rights in the region established the Southern African Gender Protocol 
Alliance and pushed all parties to go ahead. In 2007, the Draft Protocol was approved by the 
ministers responsible for gender and the ministers of justice. At the Summit in August 2008, 
the heads of state and government of thirteen member states (except Botswana and Mauritius) 
signed the Protocol (SADC 2008). In October 2011, South Africa ratified the protocol as the ninth 
member state, providing the two-thirds majority needed for it to enter into force. 
The substantive content of the Protocol is not new. It reiterates women’s rights as they stand 
in international documents such as the CEDAW, continental documents such as the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(African Women’s Protocol or Maputo Protocol), and the previous SADC Declaration on Gender 
and Development. Men’s position and rights are addressed as well, reflecting the approach 
in the Maputo Protocol. Thus men are awarded the same rights as women, for instance with 
regard to paternity leave, and they are presented not only as perpetrators but also as victims 
of rights violations. The Protocol again (see GAD 1997) defines sexual and reproductive rights 
as a fundamental human right. It warns that “traditional norms, including social, economic, 
cultural and political practices which legitimise and exacerbate the persistence and tolerance 
of gender based violence” must be eliminated (Article 21). Reflecting UN Resolution 1325, the 
Protocol addresses human rights abuses in armed conflict and calls upon member states to 
“ensure that the perpetrators of such abuses are brought to justice before a court of competent 
jurisdiction” (Article 28).
New here is the number of time-bound commitments to achieving key objectives. The Protocol 
contains fourteen targets to be met by 2015. The position of women in decision-making is one 
of the key areas. In relation to political decision-making, the 30 percent quota is replaced by 
a demand that “States Parties shall, by 2015, ensure equal participation of women and men in 
policy formulation and implementation of economic policies” (Article 15). Legislative measures 
have to be adopted “to enable women to have equal opportunities with men to participate in all 
electoral processes including the administration of elections and voting” (Article 13). Referring 
to UN Resolution 1325, “States Parties shall endeavour to put in place measures to ensure that 
women have equal representation and participation in key decision-making positions” in 
conflict resolution and peace-building processes by 2015 (Article 28). 
The link between gender equality and poverty eradication emerges in Article 18, which dictates 
that “States Parties shall, by 2015, review all policies and laws that determine access to, control 
of, and benefit from, productive resources by women” such as water, land, and capital; Article 
19 also touches on this connection in its treatment of discrimination in wage employment. 
Each state is obliged to institute a legislative framework to promote gender equality and 
amend or repeal discriminatory laws (Article 34). They should institute dispute resolution and 
adjudication facilities to enforce gender equality and exercise sanctions against discrimination. 
13  At present, there are forty member organizations.  
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Gender equality and equity shall be included in the constitutions of the member states (Article 
4). Legislation and other measures should be adopted to ensure equal treatment of women 
in judicial and similar proceedings, including customary and traditional courts and national 
reconciliation processes, and to ensure equal legal status in civil and customary law, including 
the right to acquire and hold property, the right to equal inheritance, and the right to secure 
credit. Women should also have equitable representation on and participation in all courts, 
including traditional courts, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and local community 
courts.
Regarding mechanisms for implementation, in addition to the strict deadlines set in many 
articles, the Protocol advocates affirmative action measures to attain the 50 percent target in 
decision-making positions in the public and private sectors by 2015 (Article 12), as well as time-
use studies to map the multiple tasks of women (Article 16) and public awareness campaigns 
(Article 12). Implementation of the Protocol is closely monitored by the Gender Alliance. There 
are no incentives for member states to comply except the risk of being shamed in the annual 
SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, which contains the SADC Gender and Development Index 
(SGDI) and the Citizen Score Card (CSC), where citizens rate their government.
Summary: the SADC framework for Governance Transfer 
From its early days in 1992, SADC has engaged in governance transfer because of its roots in 
the struggle for majority rule. In the founding documents, democracy, rule of law, and human 
rights are cited as fundamental principles. Democracy becomes a tangible standard in the 2001 
revised treaty, and its promotion gains traction in 2004 with the adoption of the SIPO and the 
ensuing principles and code of conduct for election observation. The rule of law is referred 
to but not actively promoted, arguably because it is seen as falling under the domain of the 
sovereign state. Non-discrimination and protection of human rights are consistently integrated 
into all documents from the beginning. SADC pays special attention to discrimination on 
grounds of gender and HIV status. The concept of good governance surfaces for the first time 
in 2001. It seems to be the least embedded and most “alien” principle, mainly linked to financial 
and development issues where the interests of the donor and business communities have to be 
satisfied.
Policies promoting the fundamental principles are cast in instrumental terms that highlight 
their importance for achieving a reduction in poverty (women’s rights, economic and social 
rights, position of people with HIV/AIDS, reduction of corruption), attractiveness of the region 
for foreign investment (good governance, accountability), and an increase in political stability 
(democracy, rule of law). Quantifiable targets have only been formulated in terms of gender 
equality, mainly linked to UN reporting requirements. There is no enforcement mechanism 
except for naming and shaming. When it comes to socioeconomic rights, SADC has opted 
for delegation of implementation to a multilevel system of tripartite committees, including 
representatives from governments, employers, employees, and other stakeholders (NGOs). 
These committees produce monitoring reports and formulate new policy documents in cases 
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where they find implementation to be lacking. There are no enforcement mechanisms other 
than the exchange of best practices. The SADC Secretariat plays a central role in this multi-
level system. When it comes to political rights, different mechanisms have been developed, 
including an early warning system, diplomatic and even military interventions (as a matter of 
last resort and only with the authorization of the UN Security Council), and a dispute settlement 
mechanism (the Tribunal). The Organ plays a key role in this last area. The next section will 
further discuss the effectiveness of these instruments.
3.2 Measures of Governance Transfer: Adoption and Application
Compared to the ambitious frameworks for governance transfer developed by SADC, the actual 
adoption and application of measures have been disappointing. The greatest success so far has 
been in the area of election monitoring (3.2.1). Of the different types of instruments identified 
by Börzel et al. (2011), SADC employs coercive measures such as diplomatic and military 
interventions (3.2.2) and litigation (3.2.3). Diplomatic interventions are sometimes accompanied 
by the threat of sanctions, although this measure is not consistently employed. Instruments 
for capacity-building, persuasion, and socialization have been grouped together (3.2.4). We find 
little evidence of financial or technical assistance from SADC; most regional projects related 
to governance transfer are funded and often staffed by external donors. However, SADC does 
provide fora for dialogue and exchange of best practices.
3.2.1 Electoral Observer Missions
SADC has conducted Election Observer Missions (SEOMs) since 2004, when the Protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation became legally binding after ratification by nine 
member states and the provisions for conducting SEOMs came into effect.  Appendix 3, Table 
1 offers an overview of the elections for which data was available and the type of statement or 
report that was released. Between April 2004 and March 2012, 28 elections took place across the 
SADC region. SADC appears to have observed all of these. In half of the cases we were able to 
locate a report by the SEOM;14 however, they are all “preliminary reports” issued immediately 
after the election. SADC never makes these available on its website, but they are sometimes 
published by newspapers or civil society groups.15 We were unable to locate reports for 14 cases. 
Six of these were from the early days of SADC election observation and perhaps indicate certain 
teething problems in the effective functioning of missions. Indeed, SADC records indicate that 
the first two missions, to South Africa and Malawi in 2004, essentially served as pilot missions 
(SADC Secretariat 2004). It is possible that no report was actually produced in these cases. In the 
other eight cases without a report, it was suggested to us that reports may have been “lost” during 
the processes of institutional overhaul and relocation to the new headquarters in 2009 (official 
at SADC Secretariat, personal communication). However, this seems an unlikely explanation for 
14 When approached, the SADC Organ supplied us with a few but not all of the missing preliminary 
reports.
15 We found no trace of the final reports, which according to the Principles and Guidelines should be 
produced within thirty days of the election. It is likely that these are never actually drafted (EISA 
official, personal communication). 
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the more recent cases, especially the November 2011 elections in the DRC, for which the absence 
of a report more likely derives from political reasons than administrative error. 
SADC endorsed all elections for which we found reports except for the highly disputed elections 
in Zimbabwe in June 2008 (see below). Irregularities and shortcomings are observed in all 
reports, but they are justified by “the novelty of a free multiparty democracy” in a poor country 
(SEOM DRC 2006; SEOM Lesotho 2007) or not considered “of such magnitude to substantially 
affect the credibility of the overall electoral process” (SEOM Botswana 2009). We have examined 
the reports in several ways: first, by holding them up to the SADC Principles and Guidelines to 
see whether observers actually use the principles as a yardstick; second, by viewing the reports 
together over time, to see whether the focal points change; and third, by comparing the reports 
to standard democracy scores and reports by other regional election observer missions. 
Referral to the SADC Principles and Guidelines (2004)
The SADC document formulates nine criteria (Article 4) upon which the evaluation must be 
based:
(1) Constitutional and legal guarantees of freedom and rights of the citizens
(2) Environment conducive to free, fair, and peaceful elections
(3) Non-discrimination in voter registration
(4) Existence of updated and accessible voters’ roll
(5) Timely announcement of the election date
(6) Where applicable, funding of political parties must be transparent and based on ag-
reed threshold in accordance with the laws of the land
(7) Polling Stations should be in neutral places
(8) Votes counted at polling stations
(9) Establishment of the mechanism to assist the planning and deployment of electoral 
observation missions
There seems to have been a shift in the way that SEOMs refer to the Principles and Guidelines. 
Up until 2009, the SEOMs used the Principles as their base of reference, but they do so in general 
terms. For example, during the 2005 elections in the DRC, the preliminary report mentioned 
the voter registration process as an area that required improvement, but it made no reference 
to the specific SADC principle at hand (SEOM DRC 2006). The mission’s statement on the 2009 
elections in Malawi contains the first explicit reference to the SADC Principles by declaring 
that the Malawi elections complied with them (SEOM Malawi 2009). The following year, the 
preliminary report from the 2010 Tanzania elections explicitly formulated the criteria on 
which the SEOM based its evaluation. In the statement on the Seychelles elections in May 2011, 
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recommendations include the “establishment of a national electoral commission as opposed to 
an Electoral Commissioner in line with article 7.3 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines” and 
“Strengthening and broadening the mandate of a Media Commission that is 
independent and will, among other things, expedite the participatory formulation 
of the Code of Conduct and access of all political parties to State media as provided 
in article 2-2-5 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines.” (SEOM Seychelles 2011) 
Thus, we conclude that the Principles serve increasingly as specific standards to guide (future) 
behavior rather than a general background document that provides reference only when 
convenient.
Focal Points and “Best Practices”
Starting with the first SEOM reports, negative comments have been voiced time and again 
concerning media bias, inadequate voter education, lack of funding, inability to verify the voters’ 
roll, or the ruling party’s use of public resources for campaign funding. (Un)equal coverage by 
mostly state-owned media is the most persistent problem, creating a huge advantage for the 
incumbent government.
The reports also give positive feedback, for instance by applauding the gender equity in the 
electoral management and electorate (SEOM Zimbabwe 2005; SEOM Zanzibar 2005; SEOM DRC 
2006). This positive counterweight to concerns falls under the section, “best democratic practices 
and lessons learnt,” transforming into a new instrument for governance transfer (SEOM Lesotho 
2007). In this context, the reports highlight and commend practices such as using transparent 
ballot boxes (Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Mauritius), providing voting materials to those with 
special needs (Malawi, Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania, Seychelles), changing the age for voter 
registration (from 21 to 18 in Botswana), providing medical emergency services at some polling 
stations (Malawi, Mozambique), granting prisoners the right to vote (Lesotho 2007, Namibia), and 
using environmentally friendly campaign material (Mauritius). Strikingly, regarding Lesotho, 
the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral model is presented as a best practice for the 
SADC region. This does not reflect the Principles and contradicts the rule that SADC does not 
discuss the electoral systems of its member states. However, the approach might be understood 
as a post hoc legitimization of SADC involvement in transforming Lesotho’s electoral system 
after the much-criticized military intervention of 1998 (further details below). 
Starting with the SEOM to the Malawi elections in 2009, consultation with national stakeholders 
and discussion of the issues and concerns that they express has become a new topic addressed 
in the evaluations and reports. It reflects a practice developed by SADC PF and SADC ECF 
election observer missions to increase their own legitimacy.
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Reliability of SADC Reports
The SADC Summit stresses time and again that well-organized elections are crucial to the 
consolidation of democracy. Given the positive assessment of elections by the SEOMs, one 
might expect a relatively high score on democracy in the region, or at least an increase over 
time. However, Hadenius and Teorell’s index on political democracy, which combines Freedom 
House and Polity IV scores into a single index, indicates that SADC remains at the same level 
of just 6.34 out of 10 in 2008 (1995: 6.27). Between 2004 and 2009, the democracy scores of SADC 
countries show small setbacks in three cases (Mauritius, South Africa, and Madagascar) and 
small to modest improvements in three other cases (DRC, Namibia, and Zambia). As a result, 
countries in the range of consolidated democracies stay there, such as Mauritius, South Africa, 
and Botswana (≥ 8.50), whereas countries with a weakly developed democracy, such as Zimbabwe 
and Swaziland (≤ 2.50), did not show any improvement between 2004 and 2009 (Lohaus and van 
Hüllen, 2011). 
There seems to be no clear connection between the level of democracy in a country and the 
SEOM’s assessment of elections. Whether scores are a high 8 or a low 1, SEOMs tend to condemn 
minor incidents while declaring elections to be free and fair overall. Recommendations are 
framed in very diplomatic language. Since this could indicate a lenient attitude on the part of 
SADC, we have compared the available reports from official missions mandated by the Organ 
with available reports by the SADC PF, SADC Electoral Commissions (coordinated by EISA), EU, 
and Commonwealth (see Appendix 3, Table 2). The reports indicate that the various observer 
missions consult with each other and discuss their findings, and this practice of caucusing to 
share observation findings has been consistently encouraged by EISA and other international 
NGOs with a long-standing involvement in election observation. Given the scarcity of resources, 
a certain division of labor has developed, wherein the SADC PF arrives in the target country at 
an earlier stage of the election process, and the SEOM then draws on its expertise and feedback 
(interview PR). This does not automatically result in a common stance, but there is a tendency for 
broad consensus to emerge from consultations. In some cases, the same concerns (for instance, 
media coverage and campaign funding) take on slightly different weight. Only two cases run 
contrary to the overall picture, where all missions generally agree on the quality of the elections 
observed: Swaziland (2008) and Zimbabwe (2005, 2008). 
Contested: Swaziland (2008)
After the 2008 Swaziland elections, the SADC EOM congratulated the people of Swaziland “for 
the lesson of civility, good behaviour, mutual tolerance and, above all, for the tremendous efforts 
to reach perfection as they embark on their gradual and challenging road for the entrenchment 
of democracy” (SEOM Swaziland 2008).
It seems odd that these elections were declared free and fair. In fact, Swaziland is not an electoral 
democracy but an absolute monarchy. King Mswati III wields total authority over the cabinet, 
legislature, and judiciary. Political parties are illegal. In the lower house of parliament, fifty-
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five members are elected by popular vote according to the tinkhundla system, in which local 
chiefs control the elections and vet all candidates. The king appoints the other ten members. 
He also appoints twenty members of the thirty-seat Senate, with the remainder selected by the 
lower house (Freedom House 2011). Pro-democracy groups boycotted the 2008 parliamentary 
elections. COSATU, the influential South African trade union, accused SADC of employing 
double standards since “the SADC observer mission accepted an electoral outcome conducted 
in an environment of banned political parties and arrests of political activists” (COSATU 2008). 
The Commonwealth election report also disagrees with the SEOM’s positive assessment, arguing 
that Swaziland’s constitutional provisions are incompatible with international standards in 
terms of respect for freedom of association and assembly, separation of powers, and the rule 
of law. It concludes by stating that “it is ultimately for the people of Swaziland to decide on the 
process and direction which should be pursued, with due regard to respect for the Monarchy 
as well as local traditions and custom, while meeting its international obligations as a fully-
fledged member of the Commonwealth, SADC, the African Union and other global institutions” 
(Commonwealth expert team report, September 24, 2008). 
Contested: Zimbabwe (2005, 2008) 
Regarding Zimbabwe, we have found disagreement concerning the elections in 2005 as well as 
in 2008. In 2005, the SEOM congratulated “the people of Zimbabwe following the holding of 
peaceful, credible, well managed and transparent elections” (SEOM Zimbabwe 2005). However, 
an observer mission of representatives from the South African Council of Churches and 
Southern African NGOs came to the conclusion that there were serious flaws in the election 
process, which did not adhere to the SADC Principles and Guidelines (Solidarity Peace Trust 
2005). Election observers from COSATU, the SADC PF, and EISA were not admitted at all. The 
opposition party complained of pre-electoral gerrymandering, flawed registration, unequal 
access to media, and restrictions on freedom of assembly (Kersting 2007). As a result, there is 
reason enough to doubt the SEOM’s positive conclusions.
A similar scenario seemed probable in 2008. After the first round, on March 30, 2008, the SEOM 
declared that in spite of “issues and concerns that require change and improvement,” “political 
parties, candidates and the electorate were conversant with … the SADC Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections” (SEOM Zimbabwe 2008a). However, the elections clearly did not abide 
by some of the principles, and once again several organizations—including the SADC PF—were 
denied accreditation to observe them. After the second round, on June 29, the SEOM changed 
its tune. It released a statement highlighting the unstable and violent period leading up to the 
run-off and the failure of the security forces to stop the violence or arrest the perpetrators of 
violence. The SEOM concluded that “the elections did not represent the will of the people of 
Zimbabwe” since the process leading up to the presidential run-off elections “did not conform to 
SADC Principles and Guidelines” and “the prevailing environment impinged on the credibility 
of the electoral process” (SEOM Zimbabwe 2008b). 
Governance Transfer by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)  |  46
Our hunch is that two reasons can explain the apparent U-turn on the part of SADC election 
observers. First, politically motivated violence and intimidation had intensified so severely that 
it became difficult to endorse the elections without seriously damaging SADC EOM credibility 
among SADC member states, especially those who had become increasingly critical of the 
Mugabe regime. Added to this was the observation that “numerous SEOM teams reported being 
harassed in the course of their duties” (SEOM Zimbabwe 2008b). If Mugabe could not even 
guarantee the safety of SADC observers who had largely legitimized his practices thus far, why 
continue protecting him? The June 2008 run-off marked a watershed in SADC’s attitude toward 
the Zimbabwean problem, as we will discuss under the heading “Interventions.”
Assessing the practice of electoral observer missions since 2004, we can conclude that member 
states now routinely invite SADC observers and that all missions are conducted according to 
the SADC Principles. The mission reports are based on observations by the SEOM as well as by 
other missions. In most cases, their conclusions find confirmation in the other reports, which 
voice similar concerns. We found two exceptions, Swaziland (2008) and Zimbabwe (2005; 2008), 
where the situation seemed to warrant an SADC intervention; to what extent such interventions 
have occurred will be discussed in the following section. 
3.2.2 Interventions (Military/Diplomatic) and Non-interventions
Based on the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security-Cooperation, 
“Enforcement action may be taken in instances where there is evidence of genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, gross violation of human rights, military coup or other threats 
to the legitimacy of the state, civil war, insurgency, or conflict which threatens the 
stability of the region or member states.” (Article 11-2-b).
All enforcement actions should be taken in consultation with the AU and UN, and with the 
authorization of the UN Security Council. As per Article 11 of the Protocol, the SADC Regional 
Early Warning Centre (REWC) was inaugurated in July 2010. In theory it should generate 
information to provide a basis for intervention by SADC. However, whether by design or default, 
little is currently known to outside scholars about the REWC. We were unable to find traces of 
any REWC reports. Moreover, the Centre’s failure to issue a warning over political unrest in 
Swaziland in 2011 has led some to question its efficacy and objectivity (Motsamai, 2011). Table 3.2 
offers an overview of SADC interventions, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
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Table 6: Summary of SADC interventions/non-interventions16
Case Situation 
SADC 
intervention 
Measures (key actors) 
Lesotho 1998 Military mutiny/
attempted coup 
Yes 
Military intervention 
(South Africa, Botswana) 
DRC 1998 Third-party aggression 
(Rwanda, Uganda, 
militia groups) 
Yes
Military intervention
(Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia) 
Angola 1992–
2002 
Civil war
No 
Rhetorical support to Angolan 
government (Summit) 
Zimbabwe 
2000–2007
General violence, state 
repression 
Sort of
“Quiet diplomacy” (South Africa) 
DRC 2004 Attempted coup 
No
Planned assessment mission not 
deployed
DRC 2006 1st democratic 
elections
Yes
Military Liaison Officers deployed 
DRC 2007 Post-election Yes Two assessment missions deployed
Zimbabwe 
2007
Mounting violence
Sort of 
Diplomatic intervention: SADC-bro-
kered talks between parties (South 
Africa) 
Lesotho 2007 Post-election violence
Yes
Diplomatic intervention: SADC-
brokered dialogue resulting 
in changes to constitution and 
electoral law (SADC Organ Troika)
DRC 2008 Renewed violence in 
eastern DRC
Yes
Fact-finding mission deployed
Zimbabwe 
2008–present 
Intensified electoral 
violence
Yes
Diplomatic intervention: power-
sharing deal, drafting of new 
constitution prior to fresh elections 
(South Africa) 
Madagascar 
2009–present 
Constitutional coup 
Yes
Sanctions: suspension of 
membership.
Diplomatic: SADC-brokered 
roadmap, power-sharing 
government until fresh elections 
Swaziland 
2011
Violent crackdown on 
protests 
No None
16  Source: own compilation.
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Interventions
SADC has intervened militarily twice, in Lesotho and DRC. Both interventions took place in 
1998, before the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the REWC, or the SSF 
were in place. Both interventions were heavily contested by some SADC member states. In both 
cases, SADC was invited to intervene by the government of the country. Since the signing of the 
Protocol, SADC has intervened through diplomacy and mediation in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, 
and Lesotho. 
Military Intervention: Lesotho (1998)
Elections were held in Lesotho in March 1998, and the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy 
Party won an overwhelming majority. The opposition alleged fraud and lodged a legal challenge, 
which was dismissed. After rioting broke out in the capital city of Maseru, the Basotho 
government and opposition parties sought mediation from the South African government. A 
report produced by a coalition of various election monitoring missions  noted some potentially 
serious irregularities in the conduct of the election, but it could not say conclusively that the 
result did not reflect the will of the people (Southall and Fox 1999). The report’s ambiguity 
fuelled political tension, and in mid September, a mutiny broke out at the main army barracks 
in Maseru. The Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, wrote to the heads of state of 
South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe to request military intervention to 
quash the mutiny. On September 22, South African troops entered Lesotho, joined by a small 
number of Batswana troops the following day. Lesotho was occupied for seven months, and 
the government was upheld. As Chair of SADC at the time, South Africa justified the decision 
to enter Lesotho by claiming to have intervened on behalf of SADC after being invited by a 
legitimate government (Likoti 2007). 
There has been some debate as to whether the intervention was actually an SADC mission or 
rather a unilateral military action by South Africa and Botswana, who claimed the SADC mantle 
in order to legitimize their actions. At the time, the official business of the SADC Organ was 
suspended due to the ongoing dispute between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the Organ’s 
role, so this avenue of SADC decision-making was for all intents and purposes closed down. 
Furthermore, SADC had no official policy at that time to deal with interventions, but the serious 
nature of such an operation would generally require endorsement from the Summit. And in 
Lesotho, the intervening countries did not have a formal mandate from SADC by way of a 
Summit resolution. Nor did the operation have a mandate from international bodies such as 
the UN or the AU. Whether the intervention aimed to uphold democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law, or simply represented a South African operation to maintain secure access to 
water supplies, as alleged by Fako Johnson Likoti, is not clear (Likoti 2007). It is clear, however, 
that if the Protocol on the Organ had been in force in 1998, the intervention would have been 
illegitimate under SADC’s own standards because it lacked a resolution from the Summit or the 
UN Security Council.
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Military Intervention: DRC (1998–Present) 
Shortly after joining SADC, the DRC government, headed by Laurent Kabila, found itself battling 
a rebel force backed by former allies, Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila appealed to SADC for military 
intervention to rescue his embattled regime (Francis 2006). After an initial disagreement between 
South Africa (opposed) and Zimbabwe (in favor) about whether to intervene, Angola, Namibia, 
and Zimbabwe had committed troops to a SADC mission to support the DRC government 
by early September 1998 and subsequently found themselves embroiled in a protracted five-
year war in the DRC. As was the case during the Lesotho intervention, SADC had no official 
policy pertaining to rules and procedures for intervention in 1998. The mission was justified 
on the grounds of external aggression from Rwanda and Uganda. However, the decision to 
intervene was taken without full consultation with or consensus by the SADC Summit. Nor did 
the mission have the backing of the UN Security Council. All things considered, SADC did not 
appear to have a legal mandate for its intervention in the DRC. 
SADC spent much of the 2000s struggling to calm the situation in the DRC. In 2002, the Summit 
expressed concern about the slow progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement (signed by DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda in July 
1999). To address this, the Summit tasked the Organ with formulating a strategy to speed up 
implementation of the Agreement. In 2004, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee 
(ISPDC) met and “reminded itself of the SADC collective undertaking to safeguard the security 
and political stability of the region within the framework of the Protocol on Political, Defence 
and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defence Pact.” To this end, the ISPDC mandated 
the Organ to send an assessment mission to the DRC to discuss with the government ways 
forward in achieving peace. However, this mission did not take place because “the relevant 
authorities in the DRC were not available to receive the mission” (SADC Secretariat 2004, Annex, 
6th MCO on PDSC). The SADC Summit vehemently condemned the coup attempt of June 2004 
and reaffirmed that “SADC would not tolerate and would not allow unconstitutional change of 
governments in the region” (SADC Secretariat 2004, Annex, 6th MCO on PDSC). 
To the historic elections in 2006, the first ever after over forty years of independence, the Organ 
sent an Observer Mission and a group of Military Liaison Officers. After the elections, won by 
Joseph Kabila, two assessment missions arrived in 2007: first the SADC Secretariat Assessment 
Mission, then a Senior Officials Mission. The latter produced a report recommending a two-
pronged approach to handling the DRC situation. On the one hand it proposed a “Diplomacy of 
Peace,” which included the establishment of an SADC Mission Office in the DRC to coordinate 
the SADC Plan of Action for the DRC (this was indeed established). On the other hand, the 
report promoted a “Diplomacy of Development,” advocating for SADC to seek investment in the 
peace process from International Cooperating Partners on the DRC’s behalf and encouraging 
external investment in the country. 
In November 2008, renewed violence broke out in Eastern Congo. An extra-ordinary Summit 
decided that SADC would immediately deploy a team of military experts to assess the situation 
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and would dispatch the SADC Military Monitoring Commission to monitor the border between 
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda (SADC Secretariat, 2008). The Summit also declared that 
SADC would not stand by and witness acts of violence by armed groups against the people of 
the DRC, and would, if necessary, send peacekeeping forces to the DRC under UN mandate. 
SADC did indeed send military officials on a fact-finding mission to the North Kivu area in 
late November, aiming “to evaluate the conditions of the displaced in the region so as to have 
an intervention plan in their favour” (congoplanet.com, November 24, 2008). However, despite 
continued fighting in the region, SADC did not sent peacekeeping troops. Mindful of its limited 
capacity to carry out armed interventions, as well as the poor outcomes of its previous military 
missions, it seems that SADC was reluctant to commit to a proper peacekeeping intervention 
in Eastern DRC. SADC’s response to the crises was roundly criticized from many quarters for 
being “slow in coming and feckless” (Newsweek Magazine, November 12, 2008). 
On November 28, 2011, presidential elections took place. SADC launched its largest ever SEOM, 
consisting of almost two hundred observers (SADC Media Release, November 12, 2011). The 
elections were marred by violence, logistical problems, allegations of fraud, and delays in 
counting the vote, with widespread fears of a return to violence (The Guardian, December 6, 
2011). SADC made the unprecedented move of issuing a joint declaration on the elections with 
election observation groups from the AU, the Economic Community of the Central African 
States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and COMESA, which “welcomed 
the successful holding of the elections despite numerous challenges.” We were unable to find 
any trace of the SADC EOM report. 
Although SADC refers to DRC as a different country than it was in 2006, when the first elections 
took place, armed groups in Eastern Congo – including members of the national army – 
continue to commit numerous crimes, among them mass rape. This does not seem to have been 
criticized by the Organ, despite Article 11 of the Protocol, which states that the Organ may seek 
to resolve any conflict that includes “large-scale violence between sections of the population 
or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
gross violation of human rights” (SADC 2001-c). Although the situation in the DRC was and still 
is of a greater scale and severity than that in Zimbabwe, the latter has received much more of 
SADC’s attention. 
Diplomacy: Zimbabwe (2000–Present) 
The political situation in Zimbabwe has been the long-running saga of Southern Africa and the 
issue over which SADC attracts the most criticism. In 2000, Robert Mugabe’s government lost 
a referendum on changes to the constitution, which would have allowed Mugabe to prolong 
his term of office, grant members of the government and security forces immunity from 
prosecution for offences committed during their terms in office, and enable compulsory land 
acquisition by the state (Nathan, 2012: 64). Threatened by the emergence of a strong opposition 
party (the MDC), and under pressure from civil war veterans who had long been promised land 
in exchange for fighting, the government nevertheless went ahead with its land reform program 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 48 • December 2013  |  51
by issuing compulsory purchase orders to white landowners. The government refused to pay 
compensation for the compulsory land seizures, claiming that the British government was 
responsible for compensating the farmers under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, 
which had ended the war in 1980. The decision to ignore the outcome of the referendum and go 
ahead with the land reform program, initiating a frequently violent process of farmland seizure, 
attracted international condemnation. Meeting in August 2000, the SADC Summit noted 
“its concern with the US Senate’s intention to put political pressure and impose economic 
sanctions on Zimbabwe … Summit expresses its solidarity with the Zimbabwe Government 
in its endeavours to equitably reform the land question in Zimbabwe for the benefit of all 
its people” (SADC Secretariat 2000). One year later, as the situation in Zimbabwe worsened, 
the Summit commended Nigerian President Obasanjo for his efforts in mediating between 
Britain and Zimbabwe on the land issue and called on Britain to “cooperate fully and enter into 
dialogue with Zimbabwe with the purpose of finding a solution to this colonial legacy” (SADC 
Secretariat 2001). 
In 2002, Mugabe was reelected president in an election condemned as seriously flawed by 
the opposition and international observers. The Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe’s 
membership on the grounds of election tampering and human rights abuses associated with land 
redistribution. The SADC Summit seemed torn between condemning “Western interference” 
and acknowledging that there was a real breakdown in the rule of law as well as systematic 
human rights abuses in the country. It condemned “distorted and negative perceptions on 
Zimbabwe projected by the international and regional media,” while simultaneously expressing 
concern that the military was too involved in the political process. The Summit implied in most 
diplomatic terms that Zimbabwe was falling short in a number of areas, notably protecting the 
right to freedom of opinion, association, and peaceful assembly; investigating political violence; 
ensuring the independence of the judiciary; and maintaining press freedom (SADC Secretariat 
2003a). In 2003, the SADC Council of Ministers noted that Zimbabwean officials were being 
excluded from donor-funded regional projects. USAID was refusing to fund the participation 
of Zimbabwean nationals, which had the effect of “undermining the solidarity of SADC.” SADC 
decided that no meetings would be convened that necessarily excluded Zimbabwe, whereupon 
“Zimbabwe expressed its profound gratitude to SADC Member States for the solidarity and 
support they have provided … in the face of pressure from sections of the international 
community” (SADC Secretariat 2003a). Meanwhile, the situation inside Zimbabwe remained 
unstable. Parliamentary elections were held in March 2005 in which ZANU-PF (Mugabe’s party) 
won two-thirds of the vote. The SADC election observation mission expressed some concerns 
but declared the election largely peaceful and credible (see section 3.2.1).
Behind the scenes, South African President Thabo Mbeki was trying to soothe the situation by 
engaging Mugabe in “quiet diplomacy.” Away from the scrutiny of the media, Mbeki tried to get 
Mugabe to make concessions and promised to engage the US, UK, and IMF in an attempt to ease 
sanctions and release funds that could help temper Zimbabwe’s spiraling economic problems 
(Graham 2006). This approach was roundly criticized from both domestic and international 
actors as a “non-policy” at best or appeasement of a despot at worst, threatening South Africa 
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with a loss of credibility in international affairs. Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy had little effect on the 
Zimbabwean government, and state-sanctioned violence and political intimidation continued. 
On March 28, 2007, the SADC Summit met in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, for an emergency two-
day meeting to address the mounting political crisis in Zimbabwe. While observers had hoped 
SADC would use the opportunity to make a strong statement against the political crackdown 
in Zimbabwe, the meeting instead resulted in a continuation of quiet diplomacy, with Mbeki 
appointed as SADC’s chief mediator. The major outcome was a decision that Mbeki would 
facilitate a dialogue between ZANU-PF and the opposition party.  
The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008 brought matters to a crisis point (see also 
section 3.2.1). The opposition party was likely the winner of the first round, but the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission withheld the results for an unprecedented amount of time. The Summit 
met to try to resolve Zimbabwe’s electoral stalemate, which was fuelling an increase in violence 
throughout the country. When finally announced, the results precipitated a run-off between 
Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, which Mugabe won. An attempt by the 
UN to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe was thwarted by China and Russia, but the US and the 
EU widened their existing sanctions. By now, SADC was hopelessly split on the issue, with 
Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, and Tanzania convinced that Mugabe had to go. Angola, the DRC, 
Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa continued to protect Mugabe (Nathan 2012: 73). In 
the aftermath of the election and with SADC’s backing, Mbeki brokered a power-sharing deal, 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA), between Mugabe’s Zanu-PF and the opposition party. 
Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister while Mugabe would remain President, and control 
of the various ministries would be divided between the parties. At a SADC Council meeting in 
February 2009, the ministers present acknowledged that the situation in Zimbabwe was very 
bad but framed it almost entirely in terms of economic problems such as hyperinflation and 
deindustrialization. Although the ministers did note the importance of Zimbabwe complying 
with the GPA, they saw the solution to Zimbabwe’s problems in “stabilizing the macro-
economic climate,” and this was hampered by Western-imposed sanctions. The Council called 
on SADC member states to support the Economic Recovery Plan for Zimbabwe and work toward 
normalizing Zimbabwe’s status with international financial institutions. The SADC Secretariat 
also set up a Humanitarian and Development Assistance Framework for Zimbabwe, providing a 
mechanism through which to distribute assistance from other member states. 
In May 2009, Jacob Zuma assumed the presidency of South Africa. During his power struggle 
with Mbeki for leadership of the ANC, Zuma had indicated that he was prepared to take a 
tougher stance toward Mugabe, which won him supporters who were disillusioned with the 
Mbeki doctrine of quiet diplomacy. And indeed this seemed to be the case. At an extra-ordinary 
Summit meeting in March 2011, SADC leaders received a report from President Zuma on the 
situation in Zimbabwe. The report was fairly critical and highlighted concerns about widespread 
human rights violations. SADC issued a stern communiqué rebuking Mugabe, which many 
African and international commentators interpreted as SADC finally preparing to take a stand 
on the Zimbabwe situation. The Summit recalled 
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“past SADC decisions on the implementation of the Global Political Agreement 
(GPA) and noted with disappointment insufficient progress thereof. … Summit 
noted with grave concern the polarisation of the political environment as 
characterised by, inter alia, resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation in 
Zimbabwe. … In view of the above, Summit resolved that:
• There must be an immediate end of violence, intimidation, hate speech, 
harassment, and any other form of action that contradicts the letter and spirit 
of GPA.
• All stakeholders to the GPA should implement all the provisions of the GPA 
and create a conducive environment for peace, security, and free political 
activity.
• SADC should assist Zimbabwe to formulate guidelines that will assist in 
holding an election that will be peaceful, free and fair, in accordance with SADC 
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. 
The Troika of the Organ shall appoint a team of officials to join the Facilitation 
Team and work with the Joint Monitoring, evaluation and implementation of 
GPA.” (SADC Communiqué of the Summit of the Organ Troika, March 31, 2011) 
This certainly seemed like a positive development, but it would be optimistic to suggest that 
it indicated the emergence of determined action by SADC. A few weeks after this statement 
was made, it was decided that the operations of the SADC Tribunal should be suspended, due 
in large part to politically inconvenient rulings the court had made against the Zimbabwean 
government. 
SADC’s response toward the crisis in Zimbabwe has been to close ranks around the country, 
fending off “Western interference” while seeking “African solutions for African problems.” As 
the political culture of the region forbids outright condemnation of Liberation-era leaders such 
as Mugabe, the country best in a position to challenge Zimbabwe (i.e., South Africa) is reluctant 
to openly do so. In light of the politically sensitive land reform issue, quiet diplomacy has 
appeared to be the only politically expedient option to deal with Mugabe. To the outside world, 
it seems that SADC has done little to resolve the crisis but, as African security analyst Greg 
Mills puts it, “Zimbabwe is not a complete failure … South Africa has kept the GPA on course, 
preventing Zanu-PF from abrogating the agreement and trying to stage its own election before 
the [new] constitution is written, or trying to push things through the constitutional process” 
(interview GM). 
Diplomacy: Lesotho (2007–2011)
After the elections of February 2007, Lesotho plunged into a state of emergency. The main 
opposition party refused to accept the election results, alleging gerrymandering by the 
government. There was also the threat of a coup by certain factions of the army (allAfrica.com, 
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July 11, 2007). In response, Southern African heads of state assembled a team of negotiators 
comprising the heads of Basotho churches and SADC Organ facilitators. The president of 
Botswana, Ketumile Masire, was appointed leader of the team. Its task was to facilitate a dialogue 
between the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho, the ruling party, the opposition 
parties, and the government (SANF, February 2012). The SADC-brokered talks concluded in 
April 2011, resulting in amendments to the Constitution (6th Amendment) and electoral law 
(National Assembly Electoral Bill 2011) of Lesotho. The elections in May 2012 brought the 
country’s first opposition-led coalition government to power.
Diplomacy and Sanctions: Madagascar (2009–Present)
In contrast to the DRC and Zimbabwe, Madagascar used to be considered one of the stable, 
middle-range democracies in SADC (Lohaus and van Hüllen, 2011). However, beginning 
in January 2009, Madagascar experienced violent protests against the allegedly autocratic 
governance of President Marc Ravalomanana, led by the former major of Antananarivo, Andry 
Rajoelina. Having lost the support of the military, Ravalomanana was forced to cede power, 
and Rajoelina declared himself acting President on March 21, 2009. SADC was swift in its 
response: the Organ Troika indicated it would recommend that the Summit impose tough 
sanctions against Madagascar, and an extra-ordinary Summit meeting ten days later suspended 
Madagascar’s membership in SADC for an unconstitutional change of government. As of 
November 2013, the suspension is still in place. 
In an effort to “return the country to constitutional normalcy,” the SADC spent US$900,000 on 
political mediation in the second quarter of 2009 (SADC Extraordinary Summit Communiqué, 
March 2009). It appointed Joachim Chissano, former president of Mozambique, as mediator. 
An agreement providing for a transitional government of unity was brokered, but Rajoelina 
did not respect its terms, leaving Madagascar in an ongoing situation of crisis (Cawthra 2010). 
After protracted negotiations, SADC’s mediation efforts contributed in September 2011 to 
the adoption of a roadmap intended to restore constitutional normalcy. Ten of the eleven 
political stakeholders signed the agreements, which allow for the appointment of a transitional 
government, a Prime Minister appointed by consensus among all stakeholders, and the creation 
of an independent electoral commission. In January 2012, the High Constitutional Court of 
Madagascar “adopted the SADC roadmap as a Malagasy legal instrument, giving its provisions 
and timetables the power of Malagasy law … [This] effectively made Rajoelina’s government 
subject to SADC authority” (Southern African Report, 2012). However, the implementation of the 
roadmap ran into difficulties. Under the mediation of Tanzanian President Kikwete a new deal 
was brokered in late 2012 (Massey and Baker, 2013). Both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana agreed to 
withdraw from participating in the upcoming presidential elections, of which the first round 
took place on October 25, 2013. Since the first round failed to produce a winner, candidates 
Richard Jean-Louis Robinson of Ravalomanana’s Avanu party and Hery Martial Rokotoarimanana 
Rajaonarimampianina, Rajoelina’s Minister of Finance, will rerun in December 2013 (Hoke, 
2013). Notwithstanding these positive developments, Madagascar’s political stability remains 
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fragile. SADC has indicated that it will only lift Madagascar’s suspension once its constitutional 
order will be restored (ANGOP, 2013). 
SADC’s swift intervention in Madagascar contrasts with the organization’s reluctant attitude 
on Zimbabwe but can be explained by political and economic differences. Rajoelina and 
Ravalomanana are not heroes of the Liberation struggles. Also, SADC countries have no direct 
economic or geopolitical interests in the island state, as opposed to their interests in Zimbabwe. 
And finally, SADC tends to intervene to defend incumbent governments rather than democracy 
in general.  
Non-intervention
We have identified two cases where diplomatic or even military action by SADC would have been 
(Angola) or would be (Swaziland) appropriate according to the organization’s own principles.
Angola (1992–2008)
Angola, one of SADC’s founding members, was torn by civil war starting immediately after 
Portuguese decolonization in 1975. The warring factions were the Marxist-Leninist MPLA 
(supported by Cuba, USSR, Vietnam, Mozambique, Algeria, and Libya), and the anti-Communist 
UNITA (supported by apartheid-era South Africa, the US, Israel, and Zaire). The MPLA won 
the country’s first post-independence elections in 1992. However, the leader of UNITA, Jonas 
Savimbi, refused to recognize the outcome of the elections and returned to armed conflict. 
After the end of the Cold War and apartheid, UNITA realized that its foreign support network 
was disappearing. SADC supported the Angolan government in quelling unrest in the country 
by starving UNITA of resources. In August 1997, the UN Security Council passed resolution 
1127, which imposed sanctions on UNITA for a lack of compliance in implementing peace 
agreements aimed at bringing an end to the war. SADC immediately expressed its support for 
the measure but did not appear to make concrete interventions into the Angolan war as it did 
in the DRC. Although other sources reported that “serious human rights abuses, including 
torture, abduction, rape, sexual slavery, and extrajudicial execution” continued to be perpetrated 
by both the government forces and UNITA (Freedom House 2003), SADC persisted in lending 
rhetorical and diplomatic support to the government. Fighting continued until the assassination 
of Savimbi in 2002. After his death, the peace process was renewed with elections scheduled 
for 2004, but this date was constantly pushed back. Civil society organizations criticized the 
delay, accusing the MPLA of imposing a “permanent coup d’état” (Bauer & Taylor 2005: 160). The 
SADC Summit remained silent on the issue. The elections finally took place in 2008. They were 
criticized by Human Rights Watch, which claimed to have evidence “suggest[ing] the polls did 
not meet the SADC Principles and Guidelines in key areas” (Human Rights Watch, September 
15, 2008a). SADC’s own assessment of the election is not known: although there is evidence (in 
news reports) that it sent a SEOM, we have not been able to obtain a copy of the report.
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 Swaziland (2011)
Swaziland is one of the last absolute monarchies remaining in the world. Organized 
demonstrations in September 2011 were met by a major, state-sanctioned crackdown on 
prodemocracy groups and activists. This action went unremarked in SADC, prompting activists 
to note that, when it comes to Swaziland, “there is no SADC criticism of the way King Mswati 
runs the country. Nobody in SADC tells the king to respect human rights” (Comfort Mabuza, 
Media Institute of Southern Africa, quoted on clubofMozambique.com, May 27, 2011). Various 
groups within the region, including COSATU and the Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA), a democracy and governance watchdog, have called on SADC to condemn King 
Mswati for these actions—but to little avail. Instead of isolating or putting pressure on Mswati, 
SADC has rewarded him with prominent positions within the Organ (Swaziland Solidarity 
Network press release, March 29, 2011). 
It is worth noting that in 2004, the SADC Summit attempted to pressure Swaziland into making 
reforms in the areas of democratization and human rights by issuing a communiqué noting 
shortcomings in Swazi governance standards (SADC Summit Final Communiqué, August 17, 
2004), but little came of it. South Africa has unilaterally applied pressure on Swaziland through 
financial measures in an attempt to engender political change—a strategy that South Africa is 
well-placed to implement, since Swaziland depends on earnings from the Southern African 
Customs Union for more than half of its national revenue, and South Africa controls its 
collection and distribution. However, King Mswati remains defiant and resistant to change. 
Why Swaziland remains unchallenged by SADC is not immediately clear. The Swazi royal 
family certainly does not have the same cachet as Liberation-era leaders (the Swazi government 
occasionally collaborated with the apartheid government), nor is Swaziland particularly powerful 
or influential in the region. It seems that SADC’s support for incumbents in power trumps the 
defense of democracy.  
It is difficult to conclude that the interventions prior to the signing of the SADC Protocol on 
PDSC in 2001 were motivated by governance transfer. However, in one case, Lesotho 1998, the 
intervention did at least serve the purposes of governance transfer, since it put in place a new 
electoral system in hopes of avoiding future incidents of electoral violence. Evidently this hope 
was misguided; Lesotho once again experienced post-election violence in 2007, when SADC 
intervened once more, this time diplomatically, again resulting in changes to the electoral 
system. Interestingly, compared to similar diplomatic interventions related to post-electoral 
violence, Lesotho is the only country that has been encouraged to alter its electoral system. 
Zimbabwe and Madagascar were encouraged to reform their constitution, but the electoral 
systems have not been challenged. A contrast to these three cases is that of the DRC, where 
SADC has made numerous interventions. The focus there has been on shoring up the regime 
and quelling unrest (hence the rather militaristic tinge to the diplomatic missions) rather 
than reforming the country’s governance institutions. Perhaps this reflects the influence of 
Zimbabwe and Angola, the DRC’s key allies within SADC, whose experience with long years of 
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civil war, Liberation-era leadership, and passing acquaintance with democracy predispose them 
to militaristic crisis solutions. 
3.2.3 The SADC Tribunal (Litigation) 
Established in 1992, in accordance with Articles 9 and 16 of the 1992 Treaty, the SADC Tribunal 
is the judicial arm of the organization, designed to “ensure that the regional economic bloc 
member states adhere to the provision of the SADC Treaty and other subsidiary instruments 
and to make sure that no member state falls foul of SADC law” (Dipholo 2011).  Article 15 of the 
Protocol on the Tribunal states that 
“1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over disputes between Member States, and 
between natural or legal persons and Member States.
2. No natural or legal person shall bring an action against a Member State unless 
he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed under the 
domestic jurisdiction.”  (SADC Protocol on Tribunal, Article 15)
In addition, the SADC Summit or the Council can ask the Tribunal for an advisory opinion. 
Domestic courts may refer a matter regarding SADC law to the Tribunal for a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation, application, or validity of provisions of SADC law. The Tribunal is 
not a court of appeal; however, in cases where a member state is in conformity to its own laws, 
but those laws contradict SADC law, a decision by the Tribunal may end up overturning that of a 
domestic court. The Tribunal considers SADC law and international law to be its standards. The 
Tribunal notes that it is not a human rights court per se, but because the SADC Treaty cites the 
observance of human rights, democracy, and rule of law as a core SADC principle, the Tribunal 
ruled in 2007 that it does have jurisdiction over such matters.
The decisions of the Tribunal are final and legally binding for the parties involved. Decisions 
should be enforced in member states in accordance with the member states’ laws and rules of 
civil procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments. When there is refusal to abide by 
the decision, the aggrieved party can approach the Tribunal again. If the Tribunal believes that 
the other party does not intend to comply with the decision, it must report the matter to the 
Summit, where the latter has a legal duty to take “appropriate action” against the recalcitrant 
party—although “appropriate action” is never defined. The Tribunal’s capacity is also limited by 
the fact that its decisions are always referred to the Summit (which must reach consensus) for 
enforcement action. 
The Tribunal is composed of ten judges, who are referred to as “members.” Five of these are 
regular members, meaning the members who ordinarily preside over the Tribunal, while the 
other five constitute a reserve pool. A full bench at the Tribunal is five members, but ordinarily 
the court sits with three members present. The members are nominated by their country. The 
SADC Council of Ministers vets and recommends them to the Summit, which then appoints 
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them to the Tribunal (SADC Tribunal website). Although the Tribunal was officially established 
in 1992, its did not begin to operate until August 2005, when the Summit appointed Tribunal 
members. The first case was lodged in August 2007. 
Table 7 lists all eighteen decisions made by the Tribunal. The commercial and employment cases 
(seven cases) are not relevant here, so they have been excluded from the analysis. One case, the 
United People’s Party of Zimbabwe v SADC & Others, dealt with electoral issues. It concerned 
the exclusion of one political party, the United People’s Party, from the mandate given by the 
extra-ordinary summit of the Organ to constitute an all-inclusive government after Zimbabwe’s 
2008 elections. The Tribunal decided that the mandate only referred to political parties that had 
gained seats in the national parliament. Since the United People’s Party did not win any seats in 
the March 2008 elections, and since the elections had been declared free and fair, the party was 
justifiably excluded from the power-sharing process, and the Tribunal dismissed its complaint.
Table 7: Tribunal rulings17
Year Case Issue Relevance for governance transfer 
2007 Ernest Francis Mtingwi 
v SADC Secretariat 
Employment 
rights
None
Campbell v Republic 
of Zimbabwe Interim 
Ruling 
Human rights/
rule of law/
democracy 
Yes – Tribunal has jurisdiction over matters 
of human rights, democracy, rule of law
Campbell v Republic 
of Zimbabwe (Main 
Decision) 
Human rights/
rule of law
Yes – ruled that Zimbabwe had denied 
the applicants (plaintiffs) proper access 
to national courts (Law/HR), had racially 
discriminated against them (HR), and failed 
to compensate for land already confiscated 
(Law) 
2008 Gideon Stephanus 
Theron and 7 Others v 
Zimbabwe (application 
to intervene in Camp-
bell case) 
Human rights/
rule of law
Yes – more landowners join Campbell case 
Gondo and Others v 
Republic of Zimbabwe 
Rule of law Yes – government must pay previously 
agreed compensation to applicants, 
and must take into account effects of 
hyperinflation (“ensuring effective 
remedies”) 
Luke Tembani v 
Republic of Zimbabwe
Rule of law/
human rights 
Yes – applicant was denied access to 
national courts, which infringed upon his 
human rights and the principles of rule of 
law
17  Source: own compilation, based on information from Tribunal website: www.sadc-tribunal.org.
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Year Case Issue Relevance for governance transfer 
2008 Albert Fungai Mutize 
& Others v Campbell & 
Others 
Human rights None – case dismissed (dispute between 
individuals)
Nixon Chirinda 
& Others v Mike 
Campbell & Others 
Human rights None – case dismissed (dispute between 
individuals)
Campbell v Zimbabwe 
Contempt of Court 
Rule of law Yes – Zimbabwe failing to comply with 
previous rulings, referred to Summit for 
action
United People’s Party 
of Zimbabwe v SADC & 
Others
Electoral issues Yes – confirmed  SADC Summit decision 
on mandate based on election outcome; 
case dismissed 
Bach’s Transport (PTY) 
LTD v Democratic 
Republic of Congo
Commercial 
issues
None 
2009 The United Republic of 
Tanzania v Cimexpan 
(Mauritius) LTD & 
Others
Commercial 
issues
None 
Bookie Monica 
Kethusegile-Juru v 
SADC Parliamentary 
Forum 
Employment 
issues
None
Campbell v Republic of 
Zimbabwe (Contempt 
of Court Ruling)
Human rights/
rule of law
Yes – Government failing to protect 
applicants from intimidation and farm 
invasions (HR), and willfully ignoring 
the Tribunal’s rulings (Law). Referred to 
Summit for action. 
Swissbourgh Diamond 
Mines & Others v The 
Kingdom of Lesotho
Commercial 
issues
None 
Clement Kanyama v 
SADC Secretariat
Employment 
rights
None 
Angelo Mondlane v 
SADC Secretariat
Employment 
rights
None 
2010 Fick & Others v 
Republic of Zimbabwe 
(contempt of Court) 
Rule of law Yes – Zimbabwe continues to ignore 
Tribunal rulings (Law), order for costs 
against the government, and referral to 
Summit
The Tribunal first ruled that it had jurisdiction over human rights, democracy and rule of law 
matters in 2007, in its second decision ever, the interim ruling in the Mike Campbell versus 
Zimbabwe case. The Campbell case used human rights and the rule of law to challenge the 
legality of the Zimbabwean government’s acquisition of agricultural land. In establishing 
its jurisdiction over the case, the Tribunal cited the Protocol on the Tribunal, Articles 14 
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( jurisdiction in all disputes related to the interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty) 
and 15 ( jurisdiction over disputes between natural and legal persons and member states), and 
the SADC Treaty, Article 4 (respect for human rights, democracy, rule of law). The Republic 
of Zimbabwe argued that there should first be a Protocol on Human Rights and/or Agrarian 
Reform to give effect to the principles in the SADC Treaty. Only then would the Tribunal have 
jurisdiction over the validity of the land reform program. However, the Tribunal argued that 
“we do not consider that there should first be a Protocol on human rights in order to give effect 
to the principles set out in the Treaty” because the Protocol on Tribunal instructs the Tribunal 
to “develop its own Community jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general 
principles and rules of public international law and any rules and principles of the law of the 
member States” (SADC Protocol on Tribunal 2007, Article 21). Since Article 4-c of the SADC 
Treaty requires states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law, the Tribunal does not need a protocol on human rights to develop jurisprudence 
in this domain. Also, based on Article 6-1 of the Treaty, Member States should “refrain from 
taking any measure likely to jeopardize the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of 
its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.” Consequently, they are 
under legal obligation to respect, protect and promote the fundamental rights listed in Article 
4. As a result, the Tribunal argued:
“It is clear to us that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of any dispute 
concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law, which are the very issues 
raised in the present application.” (SADC (T) Case No. 2, p. 25)
The Tribunal cited several international treaties and case law from international and national 
courts to stress the fundamental right of access to the court. As the Zimbabwean Amendment 
No. 17 on land acquisition had negated the jurisdiction of the courts on these matters, this 
right had been violated and the landowners were entitled to bring the matter before the SADC 
Tribunal. The Tribunal ruled that 
“the Applicants have established that they have been deprived of their agricultural 
lands without having had the right of access to the courts and the right to a fair 
hearing, which are essential elements of the rule of law, and we consequently hold 
that the Respondent has acted in breach of article 4 of the Treaty.”  (SADC (T) Case 
02/2007, 41)  
Subsequently the Tribunal had to decide on the crucial question of whether the land reform 
program was discriminatory. It ruled that this was indeed a case of indirect discrimination on 
the basis of race, thereby violating Article 6 of the Treaty. the Tribunal ordered the Zimbabwean 
government not to seize land from the 79 farmers and ruled that the government must 
compensate those it had already evicted from their farms.
The Zimbabwean government did not comply with the ruling, and the farmers who brought 
the matter to court experienced increased intimidation and violence. Zimbabwe challenged the 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 48 • December 2013  |  61
validity of the Tribunal, claiming that “even though Zimbabwe has signed the Treaty creating 
the regional court, Mugabe insists it is invalid because the Tribunal Treaty was never ratified by 
two thirds of members of the bloc” (Mpofu 2010). Zimbabwe’s justice minister “took the time to 
lecture journalists on the fact that the SADC Tribunal Treaty was only ratified by five countries 
out of the 15 that make up SADC … for the Tribunal to work properly it needs ratification by 10 
member states” (Tazvida 2010). However, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum rejected 
this argument because the SADC Treaty exempts the Tribunal from the requirement that all 
protocols be ratified by a two-thirds majority of member states before entering into force. Thus, 
they argued, when the SADC Treaty was ratified, the Tribunal automatically became a legally 
binding authority. Their view was confirmed by the Agreement Amending the Protocol on 
Tribunal, which entered into force on the August 17, 2007, and stated that the Protocol entered 
into force with the adoption of the amended and consolidated Treaty in 2001. But as Hager 
writes, “under international law, the Treaty should trump an underlying Protocol; getting that 
in writing is a different story” (2009).
The Tribunal subsequently ruled that the Zimbabwean government was in contempt of court 
and referred the matter to the Summit for action. The Summit, in turn, referred the matter to 
the ministers of justice for consideration and advice on the action to be taken by the Summit. 
They observed that “due to the complexity of the legal issues regarding Zimbabwe there was 
need for an independent legal opinion” (SADC Secretariat 2009). As a result, the ministers 
of justice commissioned an independent, six-month review of the Tribunal,18 during which 
time the court ceased to take on new cases or make rulings in existing cases. The independent 
review concluded that the Tribunal was properly established in accordance with international 
law. According to the founding affidavit in the case that will be brought against the SADC 
Summit at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (see below), the ministers of 
justice “unanimously accepted by clear implication the expert report, and confined their 
recommendations to proposed amendments to the Treaty and Protocol. Nowhere did they 
propound perpetuating the paralysis of the Tribunal, or doubt the correctness of the report” 
(African Commission, 2011). This would indicate that the decision to suspend the Tribunal rests 
solely with the Summit. 
Rather than uphold the findings of the review, the Summit instead decided to further extend 
the court’s suspension and initiate a process to amend the Tribunal’s legal instruments. It is 
widely expected that this will hamper the rights of individuals to access the court, limiting its 
jurisdiction to inter-state disputes. The decision was denounced by civil society organizations 
and human rights lawyers as a blow to the rule of law and respect for human rights in the 
region. Four of the ten Tribunal members wrote an “unprecedented” letter of protest to the 
SADC Secretariat, claiming the Summit’s decision was illegal and accusing the SADC ministers 
of justice of acting in bad faith for going against the findings of the independent review. In 
an extensive interview, Judge Ariranga Pillay, former President of the Tribunal and one of the 
18 The review was undertaken by WTI Advisors Ltd, an affiliate of the World Trade Institute, and funded 
by the German Technical Cooperation Programme towards Governance Reform Effectiveness of SADC 
Structures. 
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authors of the letter, supposed the Summit felt that it had unintentionally “created a monster … 
they didn’t think through the implications of a SADC Tribunal … they thought that, in passing 
the judgements we were passing, the Tribunal judges were just engaging in judicial activism.” 
The findings of the independent review 
“gave them a fright and they started backtracking. Up until that point, from the 
SADC leaders’ perspective, the Tribunal had merely been a vehicle to get funds 
from the European Union and others … It gave off all the right buzz words: 
“democracy, rule of law, human rights” … and then they got the shock of their 
lives when we said these principles are not only aspirational but also justiciable 
and enforceable.” (Ariranga Pillay, Mail and Guardian, August 19, 2011) 
The suspension of the Tribunal was obviously convenient for Zimbabwe. It was also convenient 
for the government of Lesotho, which was facing a multimillion-dollar lawsuit for breach of 
contract from Swissbourgh Diamond Mines Ltd, and for Botswana, which was facing a potential 
lawsuit over the forced removal of indigenous San people from their traditional lands in the 
Kalahari Desert. These countries all had interest in limiting individual access to the regional 
court, while none of the other SADC member states raised objections to dismantling the court, 
presumably in the interests of solidarity and political expediency. Even South Africa, which 
claims respect for human rights as a central plank in its foreign policy, raised no objection to 
dismantling the court, and there are allegations that South African Justice Minister Jeff Radebe 
aided his Zimbabwean counterpart, Patrick Chinamasa, in formulating an “‘extra-legal’ solution 
to the Tribunal’s findings against the Zimbabwean government” (Christie, Mail and Guardian, 
June 10, 2011).  
It is not difficult to see that the suspension of the Tribunal and the plans to bar individual access 
to a regional court when national recourse has failed represent a great step backward in the 
respect for human rights and the rule of law within the SADC region. However, this is unlikely 
to be the end of the story. Although Mike Campbell died in 2011 as a result of injuries sustained 
during detention by Zimbabwean security forces, his son-in-law, Ben Freeth, has joined forces 
with the Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO Forum and Luke Tembani, a plaintiff in another case 
against Zimbabwe at the SADC Tribunal, to take the case to the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. The AU Commission agreed in March 2012 that the Court should consider the 
case. It will mark the first time in legal history that a group of heads of state (the entire SADC 
Summit) is cited by individuals as the defendants in an application to an international court. 
In short, the Tribunal declared itself to be an institution of governance transfer without the 
explicit acquiescence of the Summit, but the tactic backfired. 
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3.2.4 Technical and Financial Assistance, Fora for Exchange and Dialogue  
To our knowledge, SADC is not able to offer much in the way of financial or technical assistance 
to its member states. The majority of projects are funded by external donors, thus we cannot say 
that SADC assists in the area of governance transfer. 
Both the RISDP and the SIPO call for the establishment of fora for exchange and dialogue but do 
not specify who should participate. Some Protocols make more specific provisions for regular 
meetings and/or committees, but in many cases these have not materialize. For example, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the proposed committee to oversee the implementation of the 
Protocol on Corruption was ever operationalized. However, some fora have been established; 
these are discussed below. 
SADC National Committees (SNCs)
The 2001 Treaty (Article 16-A) called for the establishment of SADC National Committees in 
each member state. These Committees are tasked with providing input from the national level 
into regional policy, as well as overseeing the implementation of regional policy at the national 
level. Thus they have both a “bottom-up” and a “top-down” function in the relationship between 
SADC and its members states. Each member state is asked to create a secretariat to facilitate the 
operations of the SNC (Article 16-A-9). Each SNC is supposed to meet at least four times a year 
(Article 16-A-12) and submit annual reports to the SADC Secretariat (Article 16-A-10). The SNCs 
are also mandated to meet with each other annually, to share information and best practices in 
the RIDSP’s implementation (SADC Secretariat, 2003). Thus, they can be considered a regular 
forum responsible for input, implementation, and monitoring of SADC policy.  
Annual SNC meetings have taken place since 2003 with the help of funding from International 
Cooperating Partners. By 2007, all SADC member states had established an SNC of some sort, 
with the exception of the DRC. However, not all SNCs had been submitting annual reports as 
required, a result of the fact that some SNCs were still in their infancy. For this reason it was 
considered important to continue the annual forum, since the exchange of best practices would 
increase the capacities of underdeveloped SNCs (Record of 5th Regional Meeting of SNCs, 
Zanzibar, May 10–11, 2007). SNCs themselves reported a number of problems limiting their 
effective functioning, including a lack of qualified and experienced staff and a lack of financial 
and material resources, including computers, internet facilities, printers, photocopiers, fax 
machines, and adequate office space. There was also a lack of clarity regarding the role of the 
SNC in relation to the SADC Secretariat and the local level, as well as a lack of commitment 
from the members in the subcommittees and weak coordination and information flow between 
the SADC Secretariat, the SNCs, and the member state level (Record of 5th Regional Meeting 
of SNCs, Zanzibar, May 10–11, 2007). Independent research has also indicated some problems 
with public participation in the SNCs. Research by the Namibian Economic Policy Research 
Unit found that although civil society groups may have been members of the SNCs on paper, in 
practice they often did not receive invitations to participate in meetings, and were thus excluded 
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from giving input into regional policy (Deen-Swarray and Schade, 2006). Another study on SNCs 
in five SADC member states (Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, South Africa) found that 
although all countries had entities called SNCs in place, only the South African example was 
fully functional according to the standards set in the 2001 Treaty and 2003 Guidelines on SNCs 
(Nwezi and Zakwe, 2011: 38). 
In sum, it seems that although all member states can claim to have an SNC in place, in most 
cases these are wholly inadequate structures, often consisting of a single staff member instead 
of the secretariat structure required by the Treaty. As a result, the SNCs are largely unable to 
perform the functions envisaged. 
SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Linked to the SADC National Committees is a region-wide forum for civil society groups 
operating in SADC Member States: the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(SADC-CNGO). This is not part of the structure of SADC proper, but does work frequently with 
SADC on various projects. The SADC-CNGO was established in 1998 and became operational 
in 2004. It has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the SADC Secretariat “for the 
purposes of promoting constructive dialogue and engagement with civil society.” The SADC-
CNGO states that it will “promote the re-activation and further strengthening of the SADC 
National Committees, noting that these structures are in most cases not fully established, and 
are functioning less effectively.” Clearly it sees the SNCs as a key avenue to influence the SADC 
agenda at the national level, but that role is hampered by their limited capacity. 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
Our analysis of the adoption and application of measures suggests that SADC does not live up 
to its own standards. In many cases, measures foreseen are never implemented and thus exist 
only on paper, a shortcoming most glaring in relation to good governance (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Intensity of SADC governance transfer: framework and instruments19
Framework Instruments 
Prescrip-
tion & 
Policy
EOM Military 
intervention
Diplomatic 
intervention, 
sanctions
Capaci-
ty-build-
ing
Judicial 
protection
Total 
instruments
Human 
Rights
+++ - + + - (+) ++(+)
Democracy +++ ++ + + - (+) ++++(+)
Rule of Law ++ - - + - (+) +(+)
Good 
Governance
++ - - - - (+) (+)
19  Source: own compilation. 
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Respect for human rights and non-discrimination consistently appear in all SADC documents 
with a special focus on socio-economic rights and gender equality, but there is no binding 
instrument in this field. In the domain of gender equality, targets and deadlines are formulated, 
but monitoring has been delegated to civil society, and no sanctions are available. When 
Campbell took his case concerning property rights and race discrimination to the Tribunal, it 
extended its jurisdiction to include matters such as human rights. However, the Tribunal could 
not develop into a human rights court because the Summit decided to suspend it; since then, 
individuals lack protection against human rights abuses by their own governments beyond the 
protection offered by domestic courts. For that reason, Table 8 shows “judicial protection” in 
parentheses, as a potential instrument that was nipped in the bud. 
Democracy has been the most prominent area of governance transfer in SADC. There is no 
democratic conditionality for SADC membership, but clear standards have been formulated 
for democratic elections at the national level, and these seem to become ever more relevant 
to all member states. Although we may question the conclusions SADC reaches regarding the 
fairness of elections, at least it is sending SEOMs to all elections. SADC has diplomatic and 
military means at its disposal, including sanctions. It also has applied them in some instances 
of election-related violence, post-election violence, and constitutional coup, but the application 
of measures tends to be uneven and seemingly motivated by concerns other than a genuine 
desire to reform governance institutions. Interventions only seem to take place if instability 
threatens to spill over into other countries, or if the (ideological or material) cost of intervening 
is low, as in the case of Madagascar.
 
Rule of law and good governance are less entrenched and even less consistently upheld than 
human rights and democracy. SADC did adopt a binding instrument on corruption but never 
established the supervisory committee. In this case, as in other cases, a chronic lack of financial 
means and qualified staff hinders the development of monitoring mechanisms. 
4. Explaining Governance Transfer by SADC
After discussing the standards proposed by SADC and the adoption and application of measures 
to promote and protect these standards, it is important to seek explanations to account for 
continuity and change in the different dimensions of governance transfer. We distinguish here 
between the international, regional, and national level.
4.1 The International Level
Examining the international level, we should distinguish between the international level as a 
normative reference model on the one hand and the promotion of a “global script” by actors 
situated at the international level on the other. 
Regarding the former, standards contained in SADC documents reflect previously agreed-
upon standards from both UN and continental African documents. Preambles refer to these 
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documents more specifically. The notion that African concepts and standards are different 
from those agreed upon internationally surfaces in academic work (Cobbah 1987; Mapaure 
2011) and speeches by politicians (Benjamin Mkapa, Thabo Mbeki, and Robert Mugabe) but is 
generally not reflected by standards in SADC documents. SADC documents on gender generally 
acknowledge the existence of regional standards that differ from the “global” gender equity 
standard—not so much as a justification for non-implementation but rather to note the reality 
of co-existing norms. The global norm is still framed as the preferred standard. In SADC states, 
customary laws, religious laws and “living law”20 coexist with state law. These “other” laws 
sometimes reflect specific principles concerning gender and race and clash with the “global” 
non-discrimination clause. Nevertheless, at least in principle SADC documents recognize the 
prevalence of global standards with respect to non-discrimination (Banda 2006).
Regarding the “global script,” the Cold War had a strong, negative influence on the promotion 
of good governance in Southern Africa. Particularly for the United States and the United 
Kingdom, Marxist-inspired political movements and governments were cause for concern, 
leading them to support repressive, anti-communist governments or counter-revolutionaries21 
who often undermined the rule of law and had destabilizing effects on regional politics. As 
a result, Southern African countries are often somewhat suspicious of Western motivations 
and political conditionality for aid and trade, and some governments can be particularly anti-
Western in sentiment. This probably contributes to Southern Africa’s eastward turn;22 Chinese 
investment and trade with Southern Africa has grown exponentially in the past decade and 
provides SADC states with an alternative to the political conditionality attached to Western 
investment and trade. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has somewhat neglected Southern Africa (Bauer 
and Taylor 2005). Its involvement is mainly limited to the African Growth and Opportunities 
Act (AGOA), signed by President Bill Clinton in 2000, which is aimed at boosting trade and 
investment opportunities with Africa. Countries are eligible to receive the benefits of AGOA
“if they are determined to have established, or are making continual progress 
toward establishing the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and 
political pluralism; … efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, 
increasing availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of 
human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices.” 
(AGOA 2011) 
Zimbabwe is the only SADC member state that has been excluded from AGOA from the very 
start because of its poor governance record. Madagascar was removed from the AGOA list of 
20  Living law is an informal, flexible “law” reflecting people’s day-to-day practices (Banda 2006: 14).
21  Particularly Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, the apartheid government in South Africa, UNITA in Angola, 
and RENAMO in Mozambique.  
22  With the exception of Swaziland, which recognizes Taiwan instead of the PRC.  
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beneficiaries following the coup in 2009, and the DRC was removed in January 2011 because 
of its lack of progress on the criteria. These three countries continue to receive humanitarian 
assistance such as food aid from the United States. Although AGOA conditionality is potentially 
a strong instrument for governance transfer, its application is not fully consistent with 
assessments of rule of law, political pluralism, and protection of human rights, to name just 
a few of AGOA’s eligibility criteria. According to the data presented in the Appendices, Angola 
and Swaziland probably deserve to be removed from the list as well. Arbitrary application fuels 
anti-Western sentiments in some SADC countries.
Other states also engage in the promotion of governance standards, especially Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. They give financial and 
technical assistance to projects aimed at democracy promotion, anti-corruption, the fight 
against HIV/AIDS, and women’s rights. Germany in particular prefers to fund SADC projects 
rather than donate to individual states, and German development funds and foundations23 were 
especially influential in the operationalization and development of the Tribunal.24
A number of international organizations engage in governance transfer in the region as well, 
including the United Nations, the European Union, and the Commonwealth of Nations.  
United Nations
The founding documents of SADC often refer to the UN framework, particularly the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which were 
set out in 2000 with the aim of ending poverty by 2015. However, the MDG targets concerning 
the reduction of poverty and hunger, access to education, gender equity in education, and HIV/
AIDS have not found their way into SADC policy documents. Concerning the SADC’s relatively 
strong standards on gender, the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing and its follow-up 
stocktaking exercises were a major mobilizing factor, and UN documents provide a normative 
model for SADC documents and institutionalization in the field of gender equality. The desire 
to strengthen international legitimacy plays a role in the adoption of these standards as well. 
The UN also offers technical and financial assistance. In September 2010, the UN and SADC 
signed an agreement to work together on conflict prevention, mediation, and elections. The 
UN/SADC Framework for Cooperation is intended to provide a two-way process to exchange 
knowledge of the SADC region with the UN and improve electoral capacity in the region. 
Under this framework, the UN has been working with SADC on mediating the political crisis in 
Madagascar. It seems that SADC considers the UN a useful partner in the area of security and 
conflict management, probably because the UN is one of the few international actors willing 
and able to deploy effective peacekeeping missions to conflict areas. This has been especially 
23  The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has an office in Gaborone, Botswana; the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung has 
an office in Windhoek, Namibia and edits the SADC Law Journal.
24  After its suspension in May 2011, judges from the SADC Tribunal were invited to Germany for an 
exchange of views with all German political foundations (http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.23058/). 
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relevant in cases such as Angola, where civil war was destabilizing the region, but regional 
leaders were unwilling or unable to intervene. 
African Union
Even more so than the UN, the African Union framework is central to SADC. The Preamble of 
the 1992 SADC Treaty takes into account the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Final Act of Lagos 
(1980), and the African Economic Community Treaty (also known as the Abuja Treaty, 1991). 
These documents primarily focus on economic matters. The Lagos Plan of Action includes a 
chapter entitled Women and Development, which seems to be the only part of the Plan that 
refers to notions of human rights or rule of law (anything related to democracy is conspicuously 
absent). While most of the gender issues raised in this chapter are framed in economic terms, it 
contains a subsection on legislative and administrative matters that calls for the establishment 
of appropriate bodies to monitor and review the implementation of equal treatment laws (rule 
of law) and calls for women to be more involved in drafting legislation (good governance). It 
seems that SADC cites the Lagos Plan and the Final Act mainly to support the idea of African 
states working together in order to become more economically self-reliant. The amended 
SADC Treaty of 2001 includes a reference to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (aka the 
Togo Treaty, 2000). Importantly, and in marked contrast to the Lagos Plan and Abuja Treaty, 
the Togo Treaty introduces governance concerns right from the outset. It commits the AU to 
“promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and 
culture, and ensure good governance and the rule of law,” taking into account the UN Charter, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Preamble). 
The turn of the millennium was a turning point in the promotion of governance norms at 
both the continental and the regional level, and the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) played an instrumental role. NEPAD was initiated by the leaders of 
South Africa (Thabo Mbeki), Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo), Algeria (Abdelaziz Bouteflika), and 
Senegal (Abdoulay Wade). It aimed to eradicate poverty, encourage sustainable growth, integrate 
Africa into the global economy, and promote the empowerment of women. Democracy and 
good economic, political, and corporate governance are assumed here to be preconditions 
for sustainable development. NEPAD was adopted by the AU in July 2001 as its economic 
development plan. Since the AU is essentially an umbrella organization of the Regional 
Economic Communities (including SADC), NEPAD has filtered down to the regional level and 
influenced the promotion of democratic and governance norms. For SADC, this is reflected in 
the Amended Treaty of 2001 and the RISDP and SIPO, which place a renewed emphasis on the 
same norms that are part of NEPAD. In addition, Council and Summit records indicate that 
SADC is keen to align its regional programs with NEPAD initiatives. 
As a new instrument of governance promotion, the AU and NEPAD have introduced an African 
Peer Review Mechanism, which enables a review of states’ progress in matters of governance. The 
key benchmarks include democracy, respect for human rights, and sound economic policies. It 
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is a voluntary scheme that lacks coercive elements, and it is funded primarily by the UK, Canada, 
and the UNDP. African states may opt out or withdraw from the program. A majority of SADC 
member states have signed up.25 Given the limitations inherent to the mechanism, critics have 
raised serious doubts about its potential to induce reforms in unwilling states (Akokpari 2004).
European Union
The European Community/European Union (EC/EU) has a long history of engagement with the 
region. Four of the six founding member states have had a presence as colonizer there at some 
point in history, leaving traces in the electoral, legal, and administrative systems as well as a 
problematic heritage, exemplified by the land reform programs. 
In 1977, the EC Member States adopted a collective strategy to put pressure on the apartheid 
government and encourage the economic development of the FLS by means of aid and trade 
(Holland 1988). However, the EC did not adopt proper sanctions against South Africa until 1985. 
Since then, the EC/EU has used sanctions a number of times. From 1993 to 2003, the EU imposed 
an arms embargo and travel restrictions against the government of the DRC, adding financial 
sanctions to the list in 2003. The EU cited a lack of respect for democracy as its justification for 
the sanctions (Kreutz 2006). The EU has also imposed targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe since 
2002 for a lack of respect for democratic standards, human rights violations, and harassment 
of EU staff in the country (Kreutz 2006). However, the European sanctions seem to have had a 
“boomerang effect” on SADC, actually strengthening SADC’s insistence on unity and solidarity, 
particularly when it comes to Zimbabwe (Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2010). This 
undoubtedly results from Mugabe’s influential position in the region: SADC frequently 
denounces the sanctions against Zimbabwe while making no mention of those against the DRC. 
Kabila simply does not have the kudos of a Liberation leader like Mugabe and cannot convince 
the other leaders to take a similar stance on sanctions afflicting his government. 
The EU has long been a major sponsor of regional integration efforts in Southern Africa. It 
strongly supported the SADCC from its inception, and the relationship was formalized in 1986 
through the signing of a Regional Indicative Programme under the Lomé framework. The 
Lomé framework, which shaped cooperation between the EC/EU and the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States, developed from a classic multilateral aid and trade cooperation 
agreement into a more encompassing policy framework after the European Parliament requested 
that aid be linked to minimum conditions of human rights protection (Smith 1998). In Lomé 
IV (1990–2000), emphasis was placed for the first time on the promotion of human rights, 
democracy, good governance, strengthening the position of women, and increasing regional 
cooperation. However Lomé lacked a legal basis for responding to human rights violations. 
In 2000, the Lomé Convention was replaced with the Cotonou Agreement, which ended non-
reciprocal trade preferences for trading partners and introduced the principal of aid being 
conditional upon good governance. The Cotonou Agreement is now being implemented on a 
25  Botswana, Madagascar, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have not signed up.
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region-to-region basis via Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Its stated objectives are 
the eradication of poverty through the establishment of a trade partnership, the promotion of 
regional integration, economic cooperation, good governance, and the integration of the SADC 
states into the world economy. The EU has stated that respect for democracy and human rights 
are central to EU–ACP relations. In effect, the EU has linked preferential trade to compliance 
with what it considers acceptable standards of governance. It is also worth noting that the 
SADC Secretariat is heavily reliant on European funding; if funding were to be withdrawn, 
the Secretariat would probably have to close, since SADC would be unable to pay its staff’s 
wages (Saurombe 2009). As a result, the EU is in a strong position to influence commitment to 
human rights and related standards by means of its aid and trade policies and the huge power 
asymmetry; yet critics have noted that the EU can be inconsistent, even outwardly hypocritical, 
in how this policy is exercised (Youngs 2004; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Farrell 2005; Storey 
2005; Orbie 2008).
Commonwealth of Nations
The Commonwealth of Nations, of which ten SADC countries are members, nominally engages 
in governance transfer as well, although it lacks an effective mechanism through which to censure 
members who violate its stated norms. The Commonwealth promotes democracy, human rights, 
rule of law, and individual liberty. Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2002 
for poor human rights and withdrew its membership in 2003. Since then, the Commonwealth 
appears to have lost its appetite for promoting governance norms: a leaked memo in 2010 told 
Commonwealth staff that it was not their job to criticize human rights abuses in member states 
(Borger 2010). 
4.2 The Region
Factors at the regional level play a significant role in explaining progress (or lack thereof ) in 
governance transfer. Transnational actors such as trade unions and civil society organization 
play an important role, but the region’s heterogeneity and the constraints imposed on the 
regional hegemon hamper a more progressive approach. 
Disunity, Instability, and Heterogeneity 
Behind the show of unity that SADC insists on presenting to the outside world lies a fundamental 
disunity between what we might term the “old guard” and the “vanguard” of SADC. The 
vanguard states—the more progressive, democratic states—have a vested interest in locking in 
reforms in their own governance institutions and pressuring laggard neighbors into making 
similar reforms via regional policy. This can go some way to explaining the relative success of 
SADC’s election observation missions, and it is certainly possible that the newer members of 
SADC have found membership beneficial in terms of locking in democracy. However, this effect 
could be undermined if, as we suspect, “undesirable” EOM reports are swept under the carpet 
in the service of political expediency. The old guard states, largely represented by the more 
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authoritarian regimes, are reluctant to implement governance reforms for fear that they will 
challenge the government’s authority, but they are nonetheless susceptible to pressure from 
their more progressive neighbors. The struggle between these two camps has influenced the 
reform and institutionalization of certain SADC bodies and instruments. The reform of the 
Organ in 2001 was intended to wrest control of SADC’s security apparatus away from Mugabe, 
thus reducing his influence and preventing gung-ho interventions under the SADC banner 
such as the one in the DRC in 1998. The vanguard, led by South Africa, could arguably do more 
to push the old guard toward reform. As we have argued elsewhere, however, it is difficult for 
the country to do so.
Political stability is the objective with unwritten priority in SADC, which is understandable 
given the turbulence of the past and current threats to stability. SADC has tended to ascribe a 
lack of stability to external factors such as colonialism and Western interference. At present, five 
SADC member states26 have a negative score on the World Bank’s “political stability and absence 
of violence” index, which describes “the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means including domestic violence or terrorism” 
(World Bank 2011: 118). These five countries also do poorly on indicators for “rule of law” 
and “voice and accountability.” Swaziland is an interesting exception because it ranks low on 
democracy but is considered politically stable.
Appendix 1 presents comparative data for all SADC member states. The countries are similar 
to each other compared to other world regions because of their low GDP/capita, high HIV/
AIDS rates, and low Human Development Index (HDI). But compared to each other there 
is a considerable degree of heterogeneity. Regarding GDP/capita, the Seychelles, Botswana, 
Mauritius, and South Africa are relatively well off, whereas other countries, particularly the DRC 
and Zimbabwe, are extremely poor. In terms of HIV/AIDS, South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, 
and Lesotho are hard hit compared to the DRC, Angola, and the island states. Regarding 
democracy, we can classify the countries into three categories: consolidated democracies, a 
middle group of unconsolidated democracies, and nominal democracies. Angola, Swaziland, 
and Zimbabwe fall into the third category, while Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, and South Africa 
fall into the first. The other member states have democratic institutions, but they are vulnerable 
and unstable. With respect to the state’s capacity to implement policies, SADC includes fragile 
states still in the process of state-building after years of protracted civil war (Angola, DRC), 
as well as modestly well-functioning states. Finally, the colonial heritage of Southern African 
states has contributed to the region’s heterogeneity in terms of language (English, Portuguese, 
French), legal systems, electoral systems, and administrative systems.  
These diverse characteristics influence the functioning of SADC and its capabilities to prescribe 
and promote governance standards in several ways. First, the overall low GDP means that 
SADC member states—as well as the SADC Secretariat—struggle with very limited financial 
and institutional capabilities. Second, the priority given to political stability means that SADC 
26  Angola (but improving), DRC, Madagascar, Malawi (only slightly negative), and Zimbabwe.
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supports incumbent governments even if they violate standards of good governance. Third, 
the heterogeneity tends to produce lowest-common-denominator outcomes for standards and 
policies and hampers the active promotion of good governance.
Transnational Actors
Transnational actors play an important role for governance transfer in SADC. They have been 
involved in standard setting as well as in monitoring and implementation. Strong national and 
regional advocacy networks, rooted in the liberation struggles and financially and technically 
supported by the donor community, have been very successful in this respect.
This report has discussed the role of EISA in developing standards on election management 
(section 3.1, Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections). The Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa is an active watchdog for democracy. COSATU has been influential 
in pushing for the codification of labor rights at the regional level (see section 3.1, Charter on 
Fundamental Social Rights). It has also taken a strong position on Zimbabwe and democracy-
related topics in general, frequently issuing statements lambasting both SADC and the South 
African government for failing to take suitable action in relation to Mugabe, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland. NGOs and trade unions have played an agenda-setting role concerning the rights 
of workers with HIV/AIDS. Coordinating the efforts of over 40 women’s groups, the Southern 
Africa Gender Protocol Alliance played a key role in drafting the Gender Protocol and is a 
crucial player when it comes to monitoring the Protocol’s implementation (see section 3.1, SADC 
Gender Protocol). Churches in the region are organized in the Fellowship of Christian Councils 
in Southern Africa (FOCCISA), which aims to promote respect for human rights and democracy 
in the region. Several initiatives have brought together NGOs region-wide, such as the SADC 
People’s Summits, organized by the Southern Africa Peoples’ Solidarity Network (SAPSN). Three 
apex organizations, the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC, which 
includes COSATU), the SADC-CNGO, and FOCCISA, have stepped up their collaboration. They 
regularly issue joint statements reminding SADC or individual governments (e.g., Zimbabwe, 
Madagascar, Swaziland) of their pledges to democracy and the spirit of the SADC treaties 
(Pambazuka News 2008). 
The Regional Hegemon
South Africa—or more specifically, what we might call the “Mandela-Mbeki doctrine” (Landsberg 
2000)—was central to the shift from the “old” model of African cooperation, as represented by 
the Lagos Plan and the Abuja Treaty, to the “new” model, as represented by NEPAD and the 
reconstituted AU and SADC, with their emphasis on good governance, democracy, and human 
rights as the foundations of sustainable development. In the optimism of a post–Cold War, 
pre-9/11 world, South African leadership saw a window of opportunity in which the fortunes of 
Africa could be reversed—the beginning of an “African Century” in which South Africa would 
be front and center (Nathan 2005). 
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During his term in office, Mbeki popularized the idea of the twenty-first century as a period 
of African Renaissance. The African Renaissance would comprise the flowering of democracy, 
economic growth and development, continental cohesion, and African influence in international 
relations, and NEPAD was key in promoting this vision throughout the continent. Mbeki was 
the primary actor in the development of NEPAD and the attendant change of the OAU into the 
AU.27 He “went about mobilizing support for his plan with the external powers even before it 
was drafted,” garnering support from the UK, the US, Japan, the EU, the Nordic countries, the 
World Bank, the UN, and the IMF (Nabudere 2002: 5). 
The African Renaissance and NEPAD are one dimension of the Mandela-Mbeki doctrine. 
The other is a particular approach to conflict resolution, which has subsequently become the 
manner in which SADC approaches conflict and political crisis. The South African experience 
of power-sharing and reconciliation between blacks and whites led to a belief that a similar 
model could be applied to other conflicts in Africa. For historical reasons, it is not in South 
Africa’s interest to force its will upon its neighbors, even though the country’s hegemonic 
position would make it easy. It can, however, offer its resources and leadership to bring rival 
groups to the negotiating table and keep the calm (usually through a government of national 
unity) until a free and fair election can safely be held. SADC’s post-1998 interventions have 
generally followed this approach, favoring negotiated settlements and power-sharing deals over 
the kind of approach taken by ECOWAS in Cote d’Ivoire. Critics maintain that this strategy 
merely legitimates leaders such as Mugabe and allows them to stay in power. 
South African hegemony within the region is vulnerable and easily contested, as we have laid out 
above. As a result, South Africa cannot act freely as teacher and paymaster for the promotion of 
good governance standards in the region—at least, not to the extent that it might like—fearing 
accusations of being neo-imperialist and a puppet of the West (Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro 
Hoffmann 2010). However, South Africa does try to influence its neighbors (e.g., its efforts vis-
à-vis Swaziland and Zimbabwe), although it prefers to do so “quietly” in order to avoid such 
accusations. A second constraining factor is the issue of land reform. This is a very sensitive 
political issue in South Africa and other SADC states with significant white settler populations. 
Land reform was one of the ANC’s promises when it came to power in 1994, rendering the South 
African government unwilling or unable to condemn the Zimbabwean government’s actions in 
this area. Doing so could cost the party votes in poor, rural areas that would benefit from land 
reform. 
4.3 Summary 
When it comes to governance transfer to and by SADC, it is useful to distinguish between 
demand and supply factors. Both sets of factors have a rational and a normative dimension. 
These four categories are summarized in Table 4.1.
27  Mbeki was the first chairperson of the AU when it was inaugurated in Pretoria in 2002. 
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Table 9: Demand and supply of governance transfer 28
Rational Normative
Demand Lock-in of democratic reforms, curb-
ing negative externalities, signaling
International legitimacy
Supply Active: regional hegemon, donors, and 
external powers
Active: promotion of global script
Passive: normative reference model
Regarding the rational dimension, we have seen that SADC member states have engaged in 
governance transfer to lock in democratic reforms domestically as well as in neighboring states 
and to avoid spillovers of political instability and political violence. As the regional hegemon, 
South Africa is central to the prescription and adoption of governance standards by SADC, 
although its hegemony is also vulnerable and contested. Donors are usually referred to as 
International Cooperating Partners (ICPs). They play a crucial role in financial and technical 
assistance, going beyond mere facilitation to provide direct input into the policy process and 
strengthen the capacities of civil society groups. 
For the normative dimension, it is useful to borrow Fredrik Söderbaum’s concept of sovereignty-
boosting governance, in which weak, post-colonial states use regional organizations to boost 
the official status and sovereignty of their governments (Söderbaum 2004). Engaging in high-
level summitry and signing protocols can legitimize a government. Summits look good to an 
international and domestic audience and also serve as useful forums to solve regional problems 
on a flexible and politically expedient basis while giving the impression that a process exists to 
deal with problems. Like its predecessors, SADCC and the FLS, SADC insists on formulating 
“African solutions to African problems,” although the standards adopted consistently reflect 
“global” standards. The “normative supply” comes from organizations such as the UN, the 
EU, and other international donors. They promote a particular model of regional governance 
similar to that of the European Union: market-orientated, open regionalism focused on trade 
liberalization, coupled with democratic and human rights norms. Governments in targeted 
regions hope to attract much-needed funding but at the same time do not want outsiders to 
dictate their plans of action. An agenda like the RISDP, which contains the “right” norms and 
standards, serves the dual purpose of attracting donor funding while at the same time reducing 
the risk of donors “wanting to fund something that is not a priority” (Interview PR). This is 
one potential reason why policy frequently relies on vague formulations (i.e., the membership 
criteria), and, when it is challenged or yields inconvenient results, it is clarified ad hoc or 
scrapped altogether if governments realize they have created something they can no longer 
control (i.e., the Tribunal). This helps explain why on paper, at the prescriptive level, SADC 
harbors grand ambitions of governance transfer, but when it comes to application, the reality 
does not live up to the aspiration. 
28  Source: Börzel, van Hüllen, and Lohaus 2013: 23
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5.  Conclusion
From its early days in 1992, SADC has engaged in governance transfer due to its roots in the 
struggle for majority rule. The organization’s founding documents cite democracy, rule of law, 
and human rights as its fundamental principles. SADC has two main objectives that have become 
inextricably linked since the Organ became part of SADC in 2001: the eradication of poverty, a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for political stability, and political stability, a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the eradication of poverty. Standards of good governance are 
valuable to SADC governments insofar as they contribute to these two objectives. As a result, 
policies promoting governance standards are cast in instrumental terms that highlight their 
importance in achieving a reduction in poverty (women’s rights, economic and social rights, 
position of people with HIV/AIDS, reduction of corruption), attractiveness of the region for 
foreign investment (good governance, accountability), and an increase in political stability 
(democracy, rule of law). 
Democracy has been the most prominent area of governance transfer in SADC. Democracy 
became a tangible standard in the 2001 revised treaty, and its promotion was enabled in 2004 
with the adoption of the SIPO and the ensuing principles and code of conduct for election 
observation. Regarding democratic conditionality, however, SADC weakened rather than 
strengthened its criteria. Non-discrimination and protection of human rights have been 
consistently integrated into all SADC documents from the beginning. Special attention is 
given to socioeconomic rights including the non-discrimination of workers based on gender 
or HIV/AIDS status. Rule of law and good governance are less entrenched than human rights 
and democracy. In 2001, SADC was the first African regional organization to adopt a binding 
instrument against corruption, but it never established the committee in charge of monitoring 
the standards. The rule of law is referred to in SADC documents but not actively promoted, 
arguably because it is seen as belonging to the domain of the sovereign state. The concept of 
good governance surfaced for the first time in 2001. It seems to be the principle least embedded 
and most “alien” to SADC, mainly linked to financial and development issues where the interests 
of the donor and business community have to be satisfied.
Regarding the adoption of instruments and their actual application to ensure that standards 
are respected, SADC’s record is mixed. In spite of the organization’s systematic attention to 
human rights issues, it has not established any binding instrument in this field. In the domain 
of gender equality, targets and deadlines are regularly formulated, but monitoring has been 
delegated to civil society and no sanctions are available. The Summit did not allow the Tribunal 
to develop into a human rights court. There is no democratic conditionality for candidate 
member states. However, elections in SADC member states are systematically monitored: since 
2004, SEOMs have been sent to all elections. Despite the culture of state autonomy and non-
intervention, SADC has diplomatic and military means at its disposal for intervention in its 
member states in case of, inter alia, gross violations of human rights or a threat to the state’s 
legitimate authority. SADC has applied these instruments in some instances of election-related 
violence, post-election violence, and constitutional coup, but the application of measures 
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tends to be uneven. It seems motivated chiefly by concerns about the spillover of instability 
or the defense of the incumbent government. Regarding the rule of law and good governance, 
a chronic lack of financial means and qualified staff hinders the development of monitoring 
mechanisms.
We have identified four conditions that would have to be fulfilled in order for SADC to successfully 
engage in governance transfer. First, governance transfer must be, in some minimal sense, 
in the interest of South Africa as the dominant regional power. Much as the EU requires the 
leadership of France and Germany for anything to happen, the SADC requires the participation 
and leadership of South Africa, even if that country’s interests and leadership ability are in large 
part determined and constrained by Mugabe’s influence. The second condition is that there 
must be some source of international pressure capable of “shaming” the regional organization 
for failure to comply with a global norm. As long as King Mswati’s regime is tolerated by the 
international community, there is no urgency for SADC to bell the cat. The third condition is 
the presence of some sort of demand from civil society for the implementation of governance 
standards. In large part, this explains the relative success of gender mainstreaming in SADC: 
there is both international pressure and demand from highly active civil society groups in the 
region. The fourth condition for successful governance transfer in SADC is that it must not be 
perceived as a potential threat to state sovereignty. As the Tribunal’s suspension and the SADC’s 
refusal to allow the Parliamentary Forum to transform into a legislative body illustrate, SADC 
member states are unwilling to endow any regional body or policy with the power to override 
national law and politics. 
It is evident that SADC remains very much a forum of states. Despite the strength of civil society 
in Southern Africa, it only plays a nominal role, and parliaments and opposition parties are not 
involved at all. Governments and heads of state occupy the driver’s seat and determine SADC’s 
course of action. SADC’s divide, with progressive states on one side and the conservative guard 
harking back to Liberation struggles on the other, often renders the organization unable to 
reach consensus on serious issues (e.g., the Zimbabwe crisis, the 1998 DRC intervention), which 
has the effect of undermining SADC’s credibility. 
Finally, we would like to highlight the problem of “silences”: this report has analyzed what 
is said, written, and institutionalized, rather than what remains unsaid, unwritten, and un-
institutionalized. Let us name just two “silences.” First, SADC stresses time and again the 
importance of political stability and human rights, but nowhere does it deal with the rights of 
refugees (their human rights, economic and political rights, citizenship status), who constitute 
a vulnerable group and are both a consequence and cause of political instability and conflict in 
the region. Second, SADC repeatedly states its commitment to human rights standards and non-
discrimination, but nowhere in its Protocols does it address the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transsexual/transgender (LGBT) people or the issue of violence and discrimination against 
LGBT persons and communities, which is a significant problem in many SADC member states. 
Also, despite references to human rights in many documents, there is no SADC institution 
specifically mandated to deal with human rights issues, no sector at the Secretariat specifically 
entrusted with human rights protection, and no protocol detailing human rights standards. 
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These silences and absences are hard to track down in a systematic way but may be telling in 
the framework of governance transfer.
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States since Independence
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